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In the Marine Corps, Staff Sergeants twice-passed (2P) for promotion to Gunnery 
Sergeant lower the quality of the enlisted force, slow promotion rates, and carry an 
institutional cost. The objectives of this study are to determine predictors of 2P 
likelihood, evaluate the efficacy of retention policy alternatives, and investigate 
institutional costs of retaining 2P Staff Sergeants in terms of productivity loss, excess 
subordinate attrition, and retirement obligations. 
Logistic regression is used to evaluate the likelihood of a Staff Sergeant being 
passed twice for promotion. At the time of reenlistment, Physical Fitness Test score, 
Commander’s recommendation, adverse material, Marine Corps Martial Arts Program 
belt attainment, racial identification, Armed Forces Qualification Test score, and body 
composition are significant factors in the chosen model. Markov model evaluation shows 
a 20-percent reduction in approved Staff Sergeant reenlistments reduces the twice-passed 
inventory by 9 percent, and a non-retention policy for 2P Staff Sergeants reduces their 
inventory by 60 percent. The annual cost of retaining 2P Staff Sergeants is estimated to 
have a present value of $120 million in retirement obligations, productivity loss of 2,770 
full-time equivalents, and excess subordinate attrition of 340 Marines. These order-of-
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In the Marine Corps, Staff Sergeants (E6) twice-passed (2P) for promotion to Gunnery 
Sergeant lower the quality of the enlisted force, slow promotion rates, and carry an 
institutional cost. The objectives of this study are to determine predictors of 2P 
likelihood, evaluate the efficacy of retention policy alternatives, and investigate 
institutional costs of retaining 2P Staff Sergeants in terms of productivity loss, excess 
subordinate attrition, and retirement obligations. The three policy alternatives considered 
are the base case, a quality screen at reenlistment, and a policy of non-retention for 2P 
Staff Sergeants. The key assumption for this analysis is that the promotion system is 
efficient, promoting the best and most highly qualified. The key limitation for this study 
is that the actual impact of Staff Sergeants on unit productivity and attrition is unknown. 
A logistic regression uses data from the time of a Staff Sergeants Zone C 
reenlistment to identify eight predictors of 2P likelihood,  (x) . AFQT Score ( ), 
PFT Score ( ), Commander’s Recommendation ( ), MCMAP Belt ( ), 
Adverse Material In-Grade ( ), Adverse Material Prior to Staff Sergeant  
( ), Outside Maximum Weight by Height ( ), and Black racial identification 
( xRace(Black ) ) are significant predictors, with coefficients as identified in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Logistic Regression Model of 2P Likelihood Results. 







Intercept  3.3  0.4   75 < 0.0001 - - 
  – 0.017  0.001 346 < 0.0001       0.037 0.37 
    12.1  0.9 170 < 0.0001 8,730 0.23 
  1.22  0.09 172 < 0.0001  11.4 0.22 
 – 0.64  0.07   77 < 0.0001     0.32 0.07 
   0.20  0.03   34 < 0.0001   1.5 0.03 
  – 0.009  0.002   30 < 0.0001   0.5 0.03 
  0.18  0.04   25 < 0.0001   1.4 0.02 














This analysis uses a Markov model, illustrated in Figure 1, to determine the 
impact of 2P Staff Sergeant policy alternatives on the enlisted promotion system. Each 
policy alternative uses optimization, combined with historical data and target inventories, 
to compute steady-state transition probabilities. The base-case scenario uses historic 2P 
E6 transition rates to establish a baseline for policy comparison. The non-retention policy 
denies further service to Staff Sergeants following a second pass for promotion, 
increasing the wastage rate to 100 percent for 2P E6 to attrition. The quality screen uses a 
20-percent reduction in approved reenlistments, which increases the probability of 
transition from E6 to attrition and decreases the probability of transition from E6 to 2P 
E6. The results of the logistic regression serve as the basis for the quality screen, 
targeting Staff Sergeants most likely to be 2P. Although the logistic regression has a 
misclassification rate of 33 percent, the Type I error for identifying the most likely 2P 
Staff Sergeants is only 27 percent for the selected quality screen level of 20 percent.  
 
Figure 1. Markov Model For Marine Corps Enlisted Promotions  
with 2P E6 Transitions. 
 
Implementation of the base-case, quality screen, and non-retention policies in the 
Markov model provides a comparison of annual promotion rates as a percent of the total 
inventory for that grade, and average time in grade for each rank, as shown in Figure 2. 
There is a slight increase in the promotion rate for E1 through E5 as the number of 2P E6 
in the system is reduced. The largest decrease in average time in grade is for Staff 
Sergeants, which is reduced from 4.4 years in the base case to 4.0 years for the quality 
screen and 3.8 years for the non-retention policy. 
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Figure 2. Annual Promotion Rates (left) and Average Time in Grade (right) by Grade.  
 
A comparison of steady-state inventories from the three policy alternatives reveals 
a reduction in 2P E6 inventory, while maintaining the target inventory of total Staff 
Sergeants, as shown in Figure 3. A 20-percent quality screen reduces 2P Staff Sergeant 
inventory by 9.4 percent and a non-retention policy reduces 2P Staff Sergeant inventory 
by 59.7 percent. Assuming a 6-percent discount rate, the present value of retirement 
obligations due to 2P Staff Sergeant retention are conservatively modeled as fixed 
income annuities, where a quality screen has a proportional reduction in retirement 
obligations to the reduction in 2P Staff Sergeants, from $122 million to $110 million. A 
non-retention policy incurs no retirement obligations. 
 
Figure 3. Steady-State Inventory of Staff Sergeants with 2P E6 Proportion (left) and 
Present Value of Annual Retirement Obligations Incurred by Assumed 
Discount Rate (right).  
 
In addition to retirement obligations, retention of 2P Staff Sergeants carries an 
institutional cost in terms of productivity loss. This analysis estimates productivity loss 
 xxvi
by simulating variation in Staff Sergeant leadership effect, which is a supervisor’s impact 
on unit performance or productivity. Assuming that both 2P and non-2P Staff Sergeants 
supervise the same number of Marines in grades E1–E5, the average number of Staff 
Sergeant subordinates is 8.7 Marines. The average Staff Sergeant is assumed to get 40 
man-hours of weekly productivity from each member of his or her team, which is a total 
of 388 man-hours of productivity, including the Staff Sergeant. A sensitivity analysis of 
the standard deviation of leadership effect, from 5 to 25 percent, is shown in Figure 4. 
Assuming a 15-percent standard deviation and below-average performance of 2P Staff 
Sergeants, 2,770 full-time equivalents (FTEs) are lost each year due to 2P retention. 
Productivity loss is reduced to 2,510 or 1,120 FTEs for a quality screen or non-retention 
policy, respectively. 
 
Figure 4. Sensitivity Analysis of Leadership Effect Standard Deviation (left) and 
Estimated Productivity Loss for 2P Staff Sergeant Teams with Below-
Average Performance and 15% Standard Deviation in Leadership Effect 
(right). 
 
There is also an institution cost in excess subordinate attrition resulting from 2P 
Staff Sergeant retention. Excess attrition is simulated as a function of individual turnover 
hazard, which is the probability of subordinate attrition under a specific supervisor. A 
sensitivity analysis of the standard deviation of turnover hazard, from 5 to 15 percent, is 
shown in Figure 5. Assuming the same team size, a 10-percent standard deviation, and 
below-average performance of 2P Staff Sergeants, there is excess attrition of 340 Marine 
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subordinates each year due to 2P Staff Sergeant retention. Excess attrition is reduced to 
310 Marines or 140 Marines for the quality screen and non-retention policy, respectively. 
 
Figure 5. Sensitivity Analysis of Turnover Hazard Standard Deviation (left) and Excess 
Subordinate Attrition for 2P Staff Sergeant Teams with Below-Average 
Performance and 15% Standard Deviation in Turnover Hazard (right). 
 
Given the institutional costs of productivity loss, excess subordinate attrition, and 
retirement obligations, it is clear that considerations for 2P Staff Sergeant retention 
should address more than the impact on the individual Marine; however, the most 
significant limitation to this argument is the lack of research surrounding the leadership 
effects and turnover hazards within the Marine Corps. In the base case, a 2P Staff 
Sergeant inventory of 2,384 results in estimated productivity losses of 2,770 50 FTEs, 
excess subordinate attrition of 339 6 Marines, and retirement obligations with a present 
value of $122.3 $0.2 million on an annual basis. The estimated institutional costs 
associated with each policy alternative are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Estimated Institutional Costs Incurred Annually Due to 2P Staff Sergeant 
Retention. 








Base Case 2,380 $120 M 2,770 FTEs 340 Marines 
20% Quality Screen 2,160 $110 M 2,510 FTEs 310 Marines 




These results provide an order of magnitude estimate of the institutional costs 
associated with the retention of 2P Staff Sergeants. Although these estimates are 
simulated using a number of assumptions, they represent potentially significant recurring 
costs that can be reduced through the use of identified retention policies. The results of 
this study also show that targeted retention policies can have a direct impact on 
improving promotion tempo and should supplement current promotion policies as a 
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In the Marine Corps, the term twice-passed (2P) refers to a Marine who has been 
eligible for and failed selection to the next higher rank on two or more occasions. In the 
Marine Corps, retention of 2P Staff Sergeants lowers the quality of the enlisted force, 
slows promotion rates, and has a potentially significant institutional cost. The Marine 
Corps traditionally “keeps faith” with Marines by allowing them to complete twenty 
years of service and receive a full retirement, as long as they reach the rank of Staff 
Sergeant. The high year of tenure (HYT) for Staff Sergeants is twenty years regardless of 
the number of times they are passed for promotion (Enlisted Plans Section, Manpower 
Plans, Programs, and Budget Branch (MPP-20), 2014b). The retention of Staff Sergeants 
following their second pass for promotion has been a contentious issue for the last 
30 years, with the debate involving members of the Marine Corps, Navy, and Congress. 
This debate focuses primarily on the impact to the individual Marine and the potential 
impact on promotion rates, but fails to address the greater institutional cost of retaining 
these Marines.  
Analysis of data from MPP-20 reveals that, on average, almost 16 percent of the 
total Staff Sergeant inventory has been passed twice for promotion to Gunnery Sergeant. 
Data from Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) shows that most Staff Sergeants 
receive their second opportunity for promotion prior to 13.5 years of service, but this can 
happen even earlier than the tenth year of service. The result is a group of non-
competitive Staff Sergeants who may remain in the force for as many as ten additional 
years with limited potential for advancement. The retention process, by which a Marine 
must apply for reenlistment approximately every four years, is an underutilized 
opportunity to identify Marines with limited potential for future service. Marines usually 
reach their third reenlistment between ten and fourteen years of service. During each 
fiscal year, these Marines make up the Zone C reenlistment cohort (MPP-20, 2014c). 
This reenlistment period provides an opportunity to evaluate performance and potential 
for future success.  
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A. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
The objectives of this study are to determine predictors of 2P likelihood, evaluate 
the efficacy of retention policy alternatives, and investigate institutional costs of retaining 
2P Staff Sergeants in terms of productivity loss, excess subordinate attrition, and 
retirement obligations. In order to determine predictors of 2P likelihood, this study uses 
logistic regression with a response variable where success is defined as promotion to 
Gunnery Sergeant and failure is defined as two passes for promotion to Gunnery 
Sergeant. The independent variables include both demographic and performance data 
from the Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) and Total Force Retention System 
(TFRS). The population for the logistic regression is established by the Fiscal Year 2007 
(FY07) through FY11 Zone C reenlistment cohorts. The cohorts are chosen such that 
Marines still on active duty have approximately 15–20 years time in service (TIS), 
enough time in most cases to have been eligible for the Gunnery Sergeant promotion 
board twice. The ability to predict 2P likelihood allows the implementation of an 
effective quality screen during the reenlistment process, reducing the number of future 2P 
Staff Sergeants, and improving the overall quality of the force.  
In order to evaluate the efficacy of policy alternatives, this study uses Markov 
models to simulate the impact of each policy on the enlisted inventory and promotion 
system. The policy alternatives include the base-case, quality screen at reenlistment, and 
non-retention policies for 2P Staff Sergeants. The base-case models existing policy 
conditions, the quality screen models a decrease in approved Zone C reenlistments, and 
the non-retention policy models the separation of 2P Staff Sergeants following their 
second pass for promotion. This analysis uses optimization to determine the necessary 
steady-state recruitment and promotion rates to meet future Marine Corps target 
inventories, based on historic wastage rates. The sources of data used for this analysis are 
DMDC and MPP-20. This analysis evaluates policy impacts on promotion rates, average 
time in grade (TIG), and the inventory of 2P Staff Sergeants. 
In order to investigate the institutional costs associated with 2P Staff Sergeant 
retention, this study develops a framework for considering productivity loss, excess 
subordinate attrition, and retirement obligations. This framework relies on results from 
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existing literature that reveal leadership effects, which are a measure of supervisor impact 
on team performance or productivity, and turnover hazard, which is a measure of 
supervisor impact on attrition, for various industries. Retirement obligations are estimated 
using a fixed-income annuity model. These results provide an order of magnitude 
estimate of the institutional costs associated with the retention of 2P Staff Sergeants. 
B. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
The most basic assumption of this study is that the promotion process is efficient 
and promotes the best and most highly qualified Marines at each rank and that promotion 
to Gunnery Sergeant is a valid measure of success for a Staff Sergeant. Some Marines, 
particularly those who have been passed for promotion, may challenge this assumption, 
but evaluating the efficacy of the Marine Corps promotion process is outside the scope of 
this research. Given an efficient promotion process, it is reasonable to assume that a 
Marine who is passed over twice for promotion has below-average performance or worse. 
This analysis assumes the quality, or performance, of individuals within the inventory of 
Staff Sergeants is normally distributed. This means an average Marine is retained at fair 
value, above-average Marines are retained at a discount, and below-average Marines are 
overvalued. Each portion of this analysis requires additional assumptions, which are 
addressed as necessary. 
The most significant limitation of the study is that the true impact of Staff 
Sergeants on unit productivity and attrition within the Marine Corps is unknown, which 
makes it difficult to evaluate the institutional costs. The use of results from existing 
literature and sensitivity analysis address this limitation. In addition, some performance 
data is unavailable for this analysis, specifically fitness report data. The lack of fitness 
report data makes an evaluation of performance more difficult; however, other 
performance indicators are used to provide relevant results. Available reenlistment data 
consists only of approved reenlistments, so it is not possible to determine the current 
level of selectivity during the reenlistment process. Other limitations are addressed 
throughout this report. 
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C. COURSE OF STUDY 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter I, Introduction, provides an 
introduction to the thesis, including an overview of the problem statement, objectives, 
scope, and key assumptions and limitations for the analysis. Chapter II, Background, 
considers the historical debate surrounding the retention of 2P Staff Sergeants, current 
Enlisted Career Force Control (ECFC) policies, and existing literature. The historical 
account reveals that the retention of 2P Staff Sergeants has been a contentious issue 
within the Marine Corps, Navy, and Congress for thirty years. Consideration of ECFC 
policies establishes the current state of the Marine Corps retention and promotion 
systems. Relevant literature regarding predictors of performance, inventory management 
within hierarchical organizations, and the impact of managers on organizational success 
is also considered.  
The objective of Chapter III, Regression: Indicators of Performance, and Chapter 
IV, Regression: Twice-Passed Likelihood, is to determine predictors of 2P likelihood for 
Staff Sergeants at the time of Zone C reenlistment using logistic regression. Chapter III 
introduces the data, methodology, and regressors used in the logistic regression. A 
univariate analysis of each regressor provides the basis for using these variables as 
indicators of performance. Chapter IV addresses model selection, results, and validation 
for the logistic regression. The error rate established by the regression results is used in 
the subsequent chapters as an estimate of the error rate for a quality screen. 
The objective of Chapter V, Markov Models: Enlisted Promotion, and Chapter 
VI, Markov Models: Policy Alternatives, is to evaluate the efficacy of retention policy 
alternatives and their impact on the promotion system using Markov models and 
optimization. Chapter V introduces the enlisted promotion Markov model, which 
includes a 2P Staff Sergeant state for evaluation of retention policies. The base case for 
policy comparison is established using historical transition rates and optimization. 
Chapter VI extends the model to quality screen and non-retention policies to compare the 
impact of these policies on the enlisted promotion system. 
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The objective of Chapter VII, Simulation: Institutional Costs of 2P Retention, is 
to develop a framework for estimating the institutional costs of retaining 2P Staff 
Sergeants. Productivity loss, excess subordinate attrition, and retirement obligations are 
the three types of institutional cost considered. Chapter VIII, Conclusions and 
Recommendations, highlights the conclusions of the study, makes recommendations for 








In order to address the need for better 2P Staff Sergeant retention policy, it is 
necessary to understand the problem through a history of Marine Corps force-shaping 
policies, a review of current policies, and a discussion of existing literature. The retention 
of 2P Staff Sergeants has been a contentious issue for more than 30 years and continues 
to be part of the larger debate regarding manpower policy. As General Joseph F. Dunford 
(2015) outlines in his 36th Commandant’s Planning Guidance: 
We will make the hard calls and embrace change to our long-standing 
manpower and force structure policies and processes. In this, and in all 
other areas, we will emphasize quality and capability; where necessary, 
accept risk in capacity. Accepting risk in capacity means that we will only 
man structure when we can provide proper leadership. The end state is to 
provide the continuity and quality of leadership and the appropriate 
leader-to-led ratio needed to sustain the transformation and enhance 
our combat effectiveness through personnel stability [emphasis in 
original]. (p. 7) 
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
After transitioning to an all-volunteer force in 1973, all the armed services 
struggled with managing their personnel inventory. The Marine Corps began the ECFC 
program in 1985 to formalize this process for enlisted Marines and continues to manage 
enlisted end strength through various force-shaping tools under this umbrella (MPP-20, 
1991). In order to fully understand the debate and implications surrounding the retention 
of 2P Staff Sergeants, this historical account outlines the implementation of early ECFC 
policies, the attempt to expand these policies to 2P Staff Sergeants, and the use of force-
shaping measures during the most recent force drawdown. Archived documents from 
MPP-20 provide the foundation of this history. 
1. Shaping the Enlisted Force 
The ECFC program is a collection of policies to shape the enlisted force of the 
Marine Corps. Initially, these policies included evaluating Marines for promotions by 
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), shaping of the MOS grade structures, and 
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limiting changes to the Table of Organization (MPP-20, 1991). Additional ECFC policies 
followed in the late 1980s, including lateral moves for first-term reenlistees, limitations to 
prior-service accessions, adjustment of HYT limits, and voluntary and involuntary early 
retirement programs (MPP-20, 1991). Commanders who felt their units lacked the 
appropriate mix of grade and skill sets, as well as Marines who had left the service due to 
a perceived lack of promotion opportunities, were the driving force behind these policies. 
These concerns continue to be pertinent to force-shaping policies today. 
The goal of ECFC was to shape the inventory to a target requirement while 
achieving target promotion rates. This would provide commanders with the appropriate 
ranks and skill sets, standardize the experience level at each grade, and afford comparable 
promotion opportunities across all MOS; however, an MPP-20 (1991) assessment of the 
ECFC found that the existing policies were insufficient to achieve these objectives. The 
assessment identified that the Marine Corps was experiencing slowing promotion rates 
and an increase in longevity at most ranks. For example, the proportion of Staff Sergeants 
with more than twelve years TIS increased from 24 percent at the end of FY85 to 56 
percent at the end of FY90 (MPP-20, 1991). This led to a conclusion by MPP-20 (1991) 
that “while grade shaping creates a necessary structural condition under which 
standardized promotion tempo can occur, it does not create sufficient conditions for it to 
occur” (p. 7).  
On 18 November 1991, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl E. 
Mundy Jr., approved several “up-or-out” retention policies: the separation of Marines at 
their end of active service (EAS) for 2P Sergeants, 2P Gunnery Sergeants with over 20 
years of service, and 2P First Sergeants or Master Sergeants with over 22 years of service 
(MPP-20, 1994). The separation of 2P Staff Sergeants was not approved at this time due 
to a concern of “breaking faith” with enlisted Marines who anticipated the ability to retire 
as a Staff Sergeant (MPP-20, 1994). Other approved policy changes, aimed at improving 
the Marine Corps’ ability to shape the enlisted force, included decreasing promotion 
opportunities by 10 percent for all grades, varying promotion opportunity for fast-
promoting and slow-promoting MOS, and establishing a formal “above zone” for 
Marines who had been previously considered, but not selected on a promotion board 
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(MPP-20, 1994). By 1994, the implementation of up-or-out policies effectively reduced 
the average TIS and TIG to promotion for every enlisted rank except Staff Sergeant 
(MPP-20, 1994). The expansion of up-or-out policies to the Staff Sergeant rank, or a “2P 
Staff Sergeant Retention Policy,” would subsequently become a topic of debate within 
Department of the Navy, as well as Congress. 
2. The Politics of Retention Policy 
Changes in key leadership positions, specifically Commandant of the Marine 
Corps and Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA), 
had a direct impact on the implementation of the 2P Staff Sergeant Retention Policy, as 
varying personalities and opinions came to define the debate around 2P Staff Sergeants. 
As Commandant, General Mundy approved a 2P Staff Sergeant Retention Policy in 1994, 
before his retirement in June 1995. His successor, General Charles C. Krulak, ultimately 
postponed implementation of this policy in 1996, and the policy was not revisited until 
after General Krulak’s tenure ended in June 1999. In addition to the changes in 
Commandant, the position of Assistant Secretary of the Navy (M&RA) experienced 
turnover in October 1994, when Dr. Bernard D. Rostker replaced Mr. Frederick F. Y. 
Pang. Despite past support from Mr. Pang, Dr. Rostker became vocal in his opposition to 
the proposal. These personnel changes resulted in a robust debate surrounding 
appropriate personnel policies. 
In 1994, the Marine Corps was still unable to meet its target promotion rate for 
Staff Sergeants. As a result, MPP-20 (1994) recommended expansion of existing up-or-
out policies to include Staff Sergeants, noting, “it is instinctive for us to protect our 
Marines. Therefore, it seems natural to allow [Staff Sergeants] to retire after [20 years of 
service]. However, we do not believe that we can protect our Marines if by doing so we 
hurt our Corps” (p. 4). On 30 June 1994, General Mundy approved a 2P Staff Sergeant 
Retention Policy, which would separate twice-passed Staff Sergeants at their EAS 
beginning in 1996 (Christmas, 1994).1 A two-year delayed implementation would allow 
                                                 
1 The signed 1994 decision brief, including advantages and disadvantages of the policy, is included in 
Appendix A.  
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for Staff Sergeants with more than 16 years of service to be “grandfathered” in by 
reaching 18 years of service prior to the policy taking effect (Christmas, 1994). Under 10 
United States Code § 1176, service members have retirement sanctuary at 18 years, 
guaranteeing retention for service members within 2 years of retirement eligibility 
(United States, 1996). Although this policy met the sanctuary requirement of the law, 
there was a concern about the impact on Staff Sergeants with less than 18 years of service 
who would be denied further service. 
In correspondence informing the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (M&RA) of the 
approved policy, Lieutenant General George R. Christmas (Deputy Chief of Staff, 
M&RA for the Marine Corps) expressed his belief that “separating Marines who are not 
competitive for promotion is the best way to strengthen the quality of our enlisted force” 
(Christmas, 1994, p. 1). On 7 September 1994, the 2P Staff Sergeant Retention Policy 
was officially announced, via ALMAR 267/94, with the support of Mr. Pang (Christmas, 
1995). However, following the transition to Dr. Rostker as the new Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy (M&RA) in October 1994, Lieutenant General Christmas was met with 
increased resistance to the announced policy (Christmas, 1995). In lieu of the 2P Staff 
Sergeant Retention Policy, Dr. Rostker proposed a continuation board for all enlisted 
Marines once they reached 14 years of service (Lange, 1996). The disagreement between 
Dr. Rostker and Lieutenant General Christmas eventually reached an impasse, which 
would lead to the involvement of the Commandant and Under Secretary of the Navy.  
One of Dr. Rostker’s primary concerns regarding the announced 2P Staff Sergeant 
Retention Policy was the perceived disparate treatment between officer and enlisted 
personnel of similar TIS, specifically with regard to retirement sanctuary (Lange, 1996). 
In a memo to Lieutenant General Christmas, Dr. Rostker suggested that Congress and the 
Department of Defense (DoD) intended a retirement sanctuary of 6 years for both officer 
and enlisted personnel (Lange, 1996). He referred to DoD Directive Number 1320.08, 
which, at the time, stated that officers will “normally be selected for continuation” if they 
are within 6 years of qualifying for retirement (Lange, 1996). Of note, the most recent 
change to Directive 1320.08, modifies this language to apply only to officers within 4 
years of qualifying for retirement, and adding “there is no entitlement to continuation. 
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Selection or non-selection will be based on the set criteria of the Secretary of the Military 
Department concerned” (Department of Defense, 2012, p. 4). This change in language 
reflects a growing understanding that each service must be provided flexibility to manage 
its personnel inventory. The debate over what constitutes equal treatment for officer and 
enlisted personnel and the trigger for retirement sanctuary became a recurring theme in 
discussions regarding the 2P Staff Sergeant Retention Policy. 
As full implementation of the policy approached, Congress became more 
involved in the debate, highlighted by a 1 February 1996 letter from Staff Sergeant 
Kenneth W. Geheb to the House of Representatives Committee on National Security 
(now the Committee on Armed Services):  
I was denied re-enlistment and only allowed to extend for eighteen 
months. This extension will expire when I have seventeen years and eight 
months of completed service. At that time, I will be involuntarily 
separated as a direct result of the enclosed [ALMAR 267–94]…. 
I do not see this as “Taking care of our Own.” It is wrong to put Marines 
like me out on the street at forty years old with no job skills, other than 
that of an infantryman, no pension, and worst of all, the feeling of 
inadequacy that goes along with being forced out of a service that I have 
dedicated my life. (Dornan, 1996, Encl 1, p. 1) 
On 13 February 1996, Representative Robert K. Dornan (Chairman of the Military 
Personnel Subcommittee) addressed Staff Sergeant Geheb’s concerns in a letter to the 
Commandant, General Krulak (Dornan, 1996). Representative Dornan relayed Staff 
Sergeant Geheb’s letter and expressed his own doubts about the efficacy of the 2P Staff 
Sergeant Retention Policy. He addressed retirement sanctuary, echoing Dr. Rostker, 
stating “all the services have maintained over the years, and the Congress has 
subsequently internalized, the principle that the armed forces must avoid betraying the 
loyalty of members who have served more than [15] years,” and “the Marine Corps will 
be the only service to force enlisted members out of the military with 14–16 years of 
service” (Dornan, 1996, p. 1). 
At the request of Congress and the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps 
evaluated several alternatives to the 2P Staff Sergeant Retention Policy without an 
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acceptable solution. Facing external pressure, General Krulak halted full implementation 
of the policy in an e-mail to Lieutenant General Christmas on 19 March 1996: 
Everyone that I have met with on the Hill … from Dornan to Coats2 … all 
are “in arms” over the policy … not because of the 2-P but because it is 
not “equal treatment” for both officer and enlisted. They have a good 
point. I want to put a hold on this policy pending a review by you, me, 
your guys and [Sergeant Major Lewis G.] Lee. (Krulak, 1996, pp. 1–2) 
On 19 April 1996, the 2P Staff Sergeant Retention Policy was formally suspended in 
ALMAR 163/96 in order to “examine options to lessen the impact this policy would have 
on Marines with more than [14] years of service” (MPP-20, 1996, p. 1). Following 
General Krulak’s retirement 3 years later, MPP-20 renewed its effort to implement an 
effective 2P Staff Sergeant Retention Policy. 
A 1999 draft proposal of a 2P Staff Sergeant Retention Policy would have 
grandfathered all existing Staff Sergeants, regardless of TIS; only newly promoted Staff 
Sergeants would be subject to separation if passed twice for Gunnery Sergeant (MPP-20, 
1999). In a memo to Lieutenant General Jack W. Klimp (Deputy Chief of Staff of 
M&RA), Sergeant Major Mark Ouellette (Sergeant Major of M&RA) expressed the 
support of senior enlisted Marines for the proposal; “At the [Sergeant Major of the 
Marine Corps] Symposium, all said ‘2P [Staff Sergeants] should be separated if they have 
not reached [18 years of service]’ [emphasis in original]” (Ouellette, 1999, p. 2). The 
proposal was submitted to staff sections for comment and received a mixed response. In 
staffing comments, there was a specific recommendation to screen Marines more closely 
at the time of reenlistment as a means to reduce the number who would be twice-passed 
(MPP-20, 1999). Despite widespread support within the Marine Corps senior enlisted 
population, the 1999 proposal was not implemented.3 
                                                 
2 Senator Daniel R. Coats was a member of the Subcommittee on Personnel in the Senate Committee 
on Armed Services. 
3 For additional insight into the discourse surrounding this policy, refer to Appendix B, Archived 
Correspondence Regarding 2P Staff Sergeant Retention Policy (1994–1999). 
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3. Keeping Faith During a Force Drawdown 
In 2007, the Marine Corps began increasing end strength with a target of 202,000 
Marines (Cole, 2014). By FY13, the Marine Corps reversed course and began a force 
drawdown toward post-conflict end strength targets, a reduction of 20,000–30,000 
Marines. In order to meet the drawdown requirements, the Marine Corps instituted two 
temporary programs with the aim of reducing the size of the force through voluntary 
separation, Voluntary Separation Pay (VSP) and Temporary Early Retirement Authority 
(TERA). These programs were targeted at Marines in over-populated MOS, providing 
separations pay for voluntary separations and retirement eligibility for Marines with more 
than 15 years of service in eligible MOS. The voluntary separation programs were limited 
in scope and provided only one fiscal year to realize results. 
By 2014, “voluntary separation programs [had] not resulted in sufficient losses to 
maintain a healthy opportunity for timely promotion,” prompting the first Staff Sergeant 
Retention Board announced in MARADMIN 242/14 (MPP-20, 2014a, p. 1). As a result 
of the board, 2P Staff Sergeants between 15 and 18 years of service not selected for 
retention were denied further service beyond 1 January 2015, and given the opportunity 
to apply for TERA (MPP-20, 2014a). The FY14 board considered 798 Staff Sergeants for 
retention and chose not to retain 233, or about 29 percent, of those eligible (Sanborn, 
2014). Marines selected for retention by the FY14 board are not subject to subsequent 
retention boards, one of which is planned for FY15 (MPP-20, 2014a). The FY14 Staff 
Sergeant Retention Board was the first successful implementation of a 2P Staff Sergeant 
Retention Policy, made less divisive, in part, due to the availability of TERA. However, 
this is a temporary board, along with TERA and VSP, which does not address retention 
of 2P Staff Sergeants in the long term. Effective ECFC policies are needed to manage the 
2P Staff Sergeant population in a consistent manner, regardless of increases and 
decreases to force levels. 
B. ENLISTED CAREER FORCE CONTROLS 
The Marine Corps’ use of ECFC to shape the enlisted force has continued to 
evolve since these policies were formalized in 1985. Each year, Marine Corps Bulletin 
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5314 specifies the individual ECFC policies in effect for that year. For 2015, ECFC 
policies include enlisted grade structure reviews, restrictions on prior service accessions, 
First Term Alignment Plan (FTAP), Subsequent Term Alignment Plan (STAP), 
promotion selection by primary MOS, variable selection opportunity, control of 
meritorious promotions, and service limits (MPP-20, 2014b). The STAP, service limits, 
variable selection opportunity policies have a direct impact on the inventory of 2P Staff 
Sergeants. 
1. Subsequent Term Alignment Plan 
STAP establishes reenlistment goals within each MOS for career Marines, who 
are Marines beyond their initial contract. “The purpose of the STAP is to retain enlisted 
career Marines with proven performance and demonstrated potential to meet the 
operational requirements of the Marine Corps” (MMEA, 2014, p. 1). Marines applying 
for reenlistment are placed in cohorts, or zones, based on projected TIS at their pre-
reenlistment EAS. A Zone C reenlistment cohort consists of Marines who will have 10 to 
14 years of service when they reach their current EAS (MPP-20, 2014c). With a standard 
term of enlistment being 4 years, this is approximately the third time that a Marine is 
applying for reenlistment.  
Due to current service limits for Sergeants, a Zone C Marine has likely reached 
the rank of Staff Sergeant prior to applying for reenlistment. While reenlistment of career 
Marines has traditionally been viewed as a “disapprove by exception” process, this is an 
opportunity to screen the quality of the force and shape the inventory of personnel, which 
MPP-20 (1991) acknowledges: 
We should ensure that a distinction is made between a continuation 
decision (reenlistment) and a career progression decision (promotion). The 
reenlistment process makes a decision of “qualified” or “not qualified” to 
remain in the force. The reenlistment process should, however, continue to 
be a point at which we check force quality. (pp. 16–17) 
A stronger quality screen at the time of Zone C reenlistment, as opposed to merely 
describing a Marine as “qualified,” allows for the potential reduction in the population of 
2P Staff Sergeants prior to 14 years TIS. This avoids the contentious issue of whether 
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sanctuary in intended to take effect at the 14- or 18-year mark, which has been 
controversial throughout the history of the 2P Staff Sergeant Retention Policy. 
2. Service Limits 
Current service limits require Marines to separate from active service, or transfer 
to the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, once they reach HYT without promotion to the next 
grade. These service limits include additional stipulations for 2P Marines at each rank, 
with the exception of Staff Sergeant; the HYT for Staff Sergeants is 20 years regardless 
of whether they have been twice passed for promotion (MPP-20, 2014b). This 
discrepancy reflects the lack of a permanent 2P Staff Sergeant Retention Policy and 
highlights the difference in policies regarding 2P Staff Sergeants and Marines twice 
passed for promotion at other ranks. Staff Sergeant is the only rank that does not further 
limit the HYT for 2P Marines, as shown in Table 1.   
Table 1.   2015 Enlisted Promotion Targets and High Year of Tenure Limits. 
HYT for 2P Marines are earlier than regular HYT limits for each 
rank except Staff Sergeant (after MPP-20, 2014b). 
Rank (Grade) 





2P Marine  
HYT Limit 
(Years) 
Sergeant (E5)  4.0  10  EAS 
Staff Sergeant (E6)  8.5  20  20 
Gunnery Sergeant (E7) 13.0  22  20 / Serve to EAS 
Master Sergeant /  
First Sergeant (E8) 17.5  27  22 / Serve to EAS  
Master Gunnery Sergeant / 
Sergeant Major (E9) 22.0  30  N/A 
 
3. Variable Selection Opportunity 
Each year, Marine Corps Bulletin 1430 establishes the eligible population for 
selection to the next rank and defines promotion zones for each MOS, including the 
above zone. The above zone consists of Marines who have been previously considered 
for promotion but not selected, including all eligible 2P Marines. For Marines who have 
not been previously considered for promotion, the number placed in the promotion zone, 
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or “in zone,” is determined by available promotion allocations and the MOS selection 
opportunity. Selection opportunity is the prescribed ratio of promotion allocations to the 
number of Marines placed in zone. The number of above-zone Marines within an MOS is 
not considered when establishing selection opportunity. 
Selection opportunity is varied depending on whether an MOS meets the target 
TIS to promotion and is used as a method to standardize promotion tempo for fast and 
slow-promoting MOS; the target TIS to promotion for Staff Sergeants is 8.5 1 years 
(MPP-20, 2014b). A lower selection opportunity for slow-promoting MOS increases the 
number of Marines placed in zone per promotion allocation, as shown in Table 2.  This 
has the effect of increasing the rate at which Marines are considered for promotion in 
slow-promoting MOS (MPP-20, 2014b). An indirect consequence of a decrease in 
promotion opportunity is that an increased percentage of in-zone Marines will receive 
their first pass for promotion. For Staff Sergeants in slow-promoting MOS, at least 35 
percent of in-zone Marines will receive their first pass instead of the standard 25 percent. 
This makes promotion boards for slow-promoting MOS more competitive and increases 
the number of Marines in the above zone for subsequent boards. 
Table 2.   2015 Staff Sergeant Variable Selection Opportunity for Promotion to 
Gunnery Sergeant. A standard selection opportunity is 75 percent, 
meaning 1.33 Marines are placed in the promotion zone for each 
promotion allocation and at least 25 percent of in-zone Marines will 
be passed once. For slow-promoting MOS, at least 35 percent of in-
zone Marines will receive their first pass for promotion (after MPP-
20, 2014b). 











Fast-Promoting < 7.5 0.85 1.18 15 % 
Standard MOS 7.5 - 9.5 0.75 1.33 25 % 
Slow-Promoting > 9.5 0.65 1.54 35 % 
 
The result of the variable selection opportunity policy is an increase in the 
population of once-passed and twice-passed Marines in slow-promoting MOS. These 
above-zone Marines are also competing for promotion with those placed in zone, 
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resulting in more competitive boards than the selection opportunity alone would suggest, 
which does not account for above-zone Marines. Although it seems intuitive to address 
promotion tempo with promotion policies, in a promote-to-vacancy organization, the 
appropriate way to standardize promotion tempo may lie in refined retention policies. To 
continue to improve upon existing policies, the Marine Corps must “embrace change to 
our long-standing manpower and force structure policies and processes.” 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is extensive literature surrounding manpower policies and implementation. 
The ability to understand and predict the effect of policy changes is of interest in every 
organization. A review of existing literature includes several relevant topics: predictors of 
performance, inventory management within hierarchical organizations, and the impact of 
managers on organizational success. 
1. Predictors of Performance and Logistic Regression 
Indicators of quality may be used as predictors of future performance in the armed 
services. Although Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score and high school 
graduation have been used as traditional indicators of personnel quality, these measures 
decrease in value as predictors of performance as a service member’s career continues 
(Asch, Romley, & Totten, 2005). Additional indicators of quality have been used to 
evaluate enlistment, retention, and promotion trends. Examples include rate of promotion 
to E4, computed reenlistment tiers, commander recommended reenlistment tiers, fitness 
report data, and performance at military schools; see Asch, Romley, and Totten (2005), 
Cole (2014), Ergun (2003), Hurst and Manion (1985), and Stoloff (1983). In these 
studies, indicators of quality are used both to describe and predict process outcomes.  
Some of these are aggregate quality measures that are not evaluated for their 
predictive abilities. The computed reenlistment tier includes Physical Fitness Test (PFT) 
and Combat Fitness Test (CFT) scores, rifle qualifications, and proficiency and conduct 
markings and is assumed to be a strong predictor of future performance (Cole, 2014). 
With a dichotomous response variable, logistic regression can be used to evaluate 
potential predictors; see Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) and Whelan (2013). Using twice-
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passed for promotion as the outcome of interest for Staff Sergeants, quality indicators can 
be evaluated for their predictive ability. There are a number of measurable quality 
indicators available at the time of Zone C reenlistment, as discussed in Chapter III.  
2. Inventory Management and Markov Models 
Markov models provide a useful framework for the consideration of manpower 
policies and inventory management. Bartholomew (1971) provides the foundational 
knowledge of using Markov models in organizations where leaving, or “wastage,” is a 
critical aspect of the organization, such as the military. Sales (1971) follows this work by 
applying Markov models to the Civil Service, which is a hierarchical or “graded” 
organization, and provides methods for evaluating model validity. Kalamatianou (1987) 
uses Markov models to evaluate the maintainability of systems with promotion pressure, 
such as a population of 2P Staff Sergeants: 
High values of pressure would tend to make the system unstable with 
respect to promotions. A high proportion of unpromoted employees could 
have a serious effect on the efficiency of the organization for several 
reasons. For example, a dissatisfied employee may be less efficient and 
productive because he has lost his interest… or for practical reasons. (pp. 
183-184) 
Markov models can be extended to Marine Corps manpower planning and are used to 
predict and optimize accessions, assignments, reenlistments, and promotions; see Licari 
(2013), Nguyen (1997), Raymond (2006), and Tivnan (1998). Markov models are used in 
this analysis as a method of comparing manpower policies and their impact on enlisted 
personnel inventory and promotions. 
3. The Impact of Managers on Organizational Success 
There is a growing body of literature addressing a manager’s impact on the 
success of an organization, which attempts to quantify the value of, and variation 
between, managers. Goodall and Pogrebna (2015) focus on the concept of “expert 
leaders,” those with expert knowledge in the core business of their organization. The 
authors provide a broad review of current research, revealing a range in leadership effects 
from 4 to 40 percent. Leadership effects are the impact a supervisor has on the 
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performance or productivity of their team. In a study on the productivity of technology-
based service workers, Lazear, Shaw, and Stanton (2012) find substantial variation in the 
impact of supervisors on worker productivity and retention. An average supervisor 
provides value equivalent to eighteen computer transactions per hour; however, there is a 
standard deviation of about 4.77 units of output, or 26.5 percent, in the boss effect (pp. 
14, 17). In a study using personnel and transaction data from a large Japanese auto 
dealership, one standard deviation increase in a manager’s fixed effects results in a 9.3 
percent increase in branch profit (Owan, Takahashi, Tsuru, & Uehara, 2014). 
The literature also reveals the difficulty in measuring the value of a manager 
(Goodall & Pogrebna, 2015). Branch, Hanushek, and Rivkin (2013) estimate the standard 
deviation of school principal effectiveness through an evaluation of Texas public school 
data. The authors find standard deviation estimates between 5 and 21 percent with a 
variety of models using school achievement as the response variable. In most cases, the 
“worst conceivable boss” is probably not included in a study’s sample, meaning an 
estimate of variance likely represents a lower bound and a truncation of the true 
underlying distribution (Lazear, Shaw, & Stanton, 2012, p. 16). In addition, productivity 
is not the only area in which a manager has an impact. One result shows the quality of a 
supervisor impacts employee retention such that “a boss one standard deviation above the 
mean quality… experiences a twelve percent reduction in the turnover hazard among her 
workers” (p. 21).  
The value-added of individual Staff Sergeants is not evaluated in this study; 
however, it is important to understand the potential variability in the impact of a Staff 
Noncommissioned Officer on his or her subordinates. Staff Sergeants, in particular, have 
a direct responsibility for Marines placed in their charge. The retention of the lowest 
performing Staff Sergeants is not just a matter of reduced individual performance, but 
results in lower performance for the entire team or unit. Without attempting to explicitly 
evaluate value-added measures for Staff Sergeants, the cost of retaining low performers 
can be considered using a range of reasonable standard deviations for unit performance, 
perhaps 5 to 25 percent as evaluated in Chapter VII. This variation in productivity is a 
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driving force behind the desire to identify, and reduce the inventory of, low-performing 
Staff Noncommissioned Officers. 
D. SUMMARY 
The retention of 2P Staff Sergeants has been a contentious issue for more than 
30 years and continues to be part of the larger debate regarding manpower policy. It is 
evident that politics and personalities have a large role in this debate the outcome of 
which has an ongoing impact on the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps uses a number of 
programs to shape the enlisted force and manage personnel. ECFC policies such as 
STAP, service limits, and variable selection opportunity have a direct impact on the 
inventory of 2P Staff Sergeants, but the institutional costs of these policies are not fully 
understood. A better understanding of predictors of performance, policy alternatives, and 
the impact of supervisor quality is essential to addressing the future of manpower 
management. These topics will be addressed in the chapters that follow to provide a 
framework for investigation and an assessment of the current policy alternatives. 
 
 21
III. REGRESSION: INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE 
The objective of this regression is to determine predictors of 2P likelihood for 
Staff Sergeants at the time of Zone C reenlistment. Logistic regression is used to evaluate 
the response variable of interest, twice-passed for promotion to Gunnery Sergeant, as a 
dichotomous response variable. Equation (1) is the logistic function where  (x1,..., xm ) is 
the probability a Staff Sergeant will be twice passed for promotion given x1,..., xm  
regressors, Y  is the dichotomous response (2P or Not-2P), and 0,...,m  are the 
coefficients. Equation (2) is the logit function, also known as the log-odds, which relates 
logistic regression back to a form that is similar to linear regression (Hosmer & 
Lemeshow, 2000).  
   (1) 
   (2) 
The ability to predict 2P likelihood allows the implementation of an effective 
quality screen during the reenlistment process, reducing the number of future 2P Staff 
Sergeants and improving the overall quality of the force. The data sets used for this 
analysis are derived from the Total Force TFRS and TFDW. From these data sets, 
eighteen potential regressors are identified for further analysis, eight of which are 
included in the final model following univariate and multivariate analysis.  
A. DATASETS 
The final data set is compiled from two Marine Corps databases, TFRS and 
TFDW. TFRS data is used to establish the population of interest and provides 
information from the time of reenlistment. TFDW data is collected for the established 
population in order to identify 2P Staff Sergeants and supplement the TFRS data. 
Individual fitness report histories from the Automated Performance Evaluation System 
(A-PES), which would provide additional 2P indicators, are unavailable at the time of 
 (x1,..., xm )  E(Y | x1,..., xm )  e
01x1...mxm
1 e01x1...mxm




  0  1x1  ... mxm
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this study. Although this limitation is significant, the data obtained from TFRS and 
TFDW provide valuable insight into the factors that contribute to a Staff Sergeant being 
twice-passed. 
1. Total Force Retention System 
The TFRS database is used by the Marine Corps to process Reenlistment, 
Extension, and Lateral Move (RELM) requests, and contains archives of prior requests. 
TFRS data, provided by the Enlisted Retention Section (MMEA-1) at M&RA, includes 
all Staff Sergeant Zone C reenlistments from FY07 to FY11. This data set consists of 
17,736 observations. Each observation represents an approved RELM request and 
includes the requesting Marine’s identification number, fiscal year of reenlistment, pre-
reenlistment EAS, Armed Forces Active Duty Base Date (AFADBD), date of rank, MOS, 
adverse conduct, Commanding General certification, PFT and CFT scores, body 
composition, racial identification, and commander’s reenlistment recommendation. This 
is a snapshot of the submitted RELM, providing measures of performance for a Marine at 
the time of reenlistment. Noted absences in the archived TFRS performance data include 
MCMAP belt attainment, rifle qualification, and pistol qualification. 
2. Total Force Data Warehouse 
TFDW retains a monthly snapshot of personnel files from the Marine Corps Total 
Force System. TFDW data, provided by the TFDW Service Desk, includes personnel 
records for each Marine identified. These records include draw case codes, which are 
administrative annotations for each individual, including “AT – Marine twice-passed for 
promotion.” 2P Staff Sergeants are identified by evaluating assigned draw case codes 
from each Marine’s time as a Staff Sergeant. The TFDW records also include historical 
data on individual AFQT scores, awards received, PFT and CFT scores, demographic 
information, body composition, legal action, MCMAP belt attainment, rifle and pistol 
qualifications, and promotion data. These records establish the level of the response, 2P 
or Not-2P, for each observation and supplement the TFRS data. 
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3. Final Population Sample 
Of the 17,736 observations identified as Zone C by TFRS, only 9,212 of these are 
within 10–14 years of service based on AFADBD and pre-reenlistment EAS. By 
definition, Zone C reenlistment cohorts only include service members with 10–14 years 
TIS, so the additional records are excluded from this analysis. Another 905 observations 
are excluded due to having an indeterminate 2P outcome, meaning it was not possible to 
determine if the individual is going to be a 2P Staff Sergeant. Only the second RELM 
approval is considered for individuals with multiple approved RELMs during this period, 
eliminating another 156 observations. This results in a total of 8,151 individual 
observations for the final sample, as illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.  Reduction of 17,736 Initial Observations to Final Sample Size of 
8,151. An analysis of available TFRS and TFDW data results in a final 
sample size of 8,151 observations for FY07–FY11 Zone C Staff 
Sergeant reenlistments. 
In the final sample, 40.7 percent of Staff Sergeants are twice-passed for 
promotion to Gunnery Sergeant. This is not to say that they are never promoted; 32.9 
percent of 2P Staff Sergeants in the sample are promoted after they have reached 2P. For 
this analysis, there is no distinction made for those who are eventually promoted. Staff 
Sergeants are considered 2P if they are twice-passed for Gunnery Sergeant at any point. 
The proportion of Staff Sergeants twice-passed by MOS category is shown in Figure 2. 
MOS categories are specified in Appendix C.  
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Figure 2.  Proportion of Staff Sergeants Twice-Passed (2P) by MOS Category. 
Of the final sample, 40.7 percent are identified as twice-passed. 
Infantry has the highest proportion of Staff Sergeants twice-passed at 
44.9 percent, and Communications has the lowest proportion at 37.5 
percent. 
B. UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
In total, eighteen potential variables from the TFRS and TFDW data are 
considered for inclusion and initially evaluated using univariate regression: AFQT Score 
( xAFQT ), PFT Score ( xPFT ), Commander’s Recommendation ( xCORec ), MCMAP Belt  
( xMCMAP ), Pistol Qualification ( xPistol ), Rifle Qualification ( xRifle ), Adverse Material In-
Grade ( xAdverseInGrade), Adverse Material Prior to E6 ( xAdversePrior ), Awarded Bronze Star or 
Higher Award ( xBronzeStarOrGreater ), Commanding General Certification ( ), Female  
( xFemale ), Education Beyond High School ( xGreaterThanHS ), Hispanic Ethnicity ( xHispanic), 
Purple Heart Recipient ( xPurpleHeart ), Outside Maximum Weight by Height ( xTaped ), Fiscal 
Year of Reenlistment ( xFY (_)), MOS Category ( xMOS (_) ), and Racial Identification  
( xRace(_) ). Variables shown to be significant during univariate analysis are further 
considered using multivariate regression techniques. Summary statistics for the eighteen 
considered variables are shown in Table 3.   
xCGCert
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Table 3.   Summary Statistics for Considered Variables. The selected model 
includes two continuous variables, two ordinal variables, and four 
binary variables. Ordinal variables are evaluated as continuous 
throughout the analysis. Binary variables evaluate to [1] if true and 
[0] if false; the mean of the binary variables represents the percent 
true. Nominal variables are coded with a binary dummy variable for 
each level. 







xAFQT  X Continuous 15 99 60 18 
xPFT  X Continuous 110 300 239 33 












(Black Belt) 3.62 1.26 




(Expert) 3.00 0.81 
xRifle   Ordinal 1 (Unqualified) 
4 
(Expert) 3.55 0.71 
xAdverseInGrade  X Binary 0 1 0.04 0.20 
xAdversePrior  X Binary 0 1 0.17 0.37 
xBronzeStarOrGreater   Binary 0 1 0.03 0.18 
xCGCert   Binary 0 1 0.01 0.11 
xFemale   Binary 0 1 0.06 0.23 
xGreaterThanHS   Binary 0 1 0.07 0.25 
xHispanic   Binary 0 1 0.17 0.38 
xPurpleHeart   Binary 0 1 0.02 0.14 
xTaped  X Binary 0 1 0.19 0.39 
xFY (_)  Nominal  5 Levels  N/A N/A 
xMOS(_)   Nominal 10 Levels N/A N/A 
xRace(_)  X Nominal 5 Levels N/A N/A 
 
Eight variables are retained following univariate analysis and model selection: 
xAFQT , xPFT , xCORec , xMCMAP , xAdverseInGrade , xAdversePrior , xTaped , and xRace(Black ) . Seven 
additional variables ( xPistol , xRifle , xCGCert , xFemale , xGreaterThanHS , xPurpleHeart , and xMOS(_) ) are 
explanatory variables in a univariate analysis, all with p-values less than 0.1. These 
variables are included during the multivariate analysis; however, they are not significant 
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factors for the final model and are eliminated during the model selection process. The 
final three variables considered ( xFY (_), xBronzeStarOrGreater , and xHispanic ) are found to be 
insignificant during univariate analysis, all with p-values greater than 0.35, and omitted 
from further analysis. The detailed univariate analysis for the eight selected variables 
follows. Univariate analysis for the variables not selected is included in Appendix D. 
1. AFQT Score 
AFQT score, xAFQT , is the result of a standardized test given to each Marine prior 
to his or her initial enlistment and is a common measure used to evaluate personnel 
quality. TFDW data provides AFQT scores, and eleven missing values are replaced with 
the mean score of 60. Initially, an analysis is done to assess whether the logit( ) is linear 
in xAFQT . AFQT score is binned by five point increments, and the proportion twice-passed  
( ) is calculated and smoothed using a kernel smoother. The logit of the smoothed   is 
plotted against binned AFQT scores, shown in Figure 3. Although the relationship looks 
like it may change for scores higher than 75, only the overall linear relationship is found 
to be significant during the model selection process. The univariate logistic regression on 
xAFQT  reflects a reduced 2P likelihood as AFQT score increases, also shown in Figure 3.  
  
Figure 3.  Log-Odds (left) and Logistic Fit (right) of 2P Staff Sergeants by AFQT 
Score. A linear relationship reveals a lower AFQT score is correlated 
to a higher 2P likelihood (Chi-Squared = 24; p-value < 0.01). The plot 
of logistic fit includes jittered data points (Red = 2P, Blue = Non-2P) 







2. PFT Score 
PFT score, xPFT , is used as the primary measure of a Marine’s physical fitness 
and is evaluated annually. Although data on CFT scores is now available, the CFT was 
not implemented until FY08 and was not retained in TFRS until FY11, so it is omitted 
from the analysis. PFT score is captured at the time of Zone C reenlistment from the 
TFRS data, and 79 missing values are replaced with the mean value of 239. To determine 
linearity of logit( ), PFT score is binned by ten-point increments; the proportion twice-
passed,  , is calculated and smoothed using a kernel smoother. The logit of the smoothed 
  is plotted against binned PFT scores, revealing a nearly linear relationship, as shown in 
Figure 4. The univariate logistic regression on xPFT  reflects a reduced 2P likelihood as 
PFT score increases, also shown in Figure 4.  
  
Figure 4.  Log-Odds (left) and Logistic Fit (right) of 2P Staff Sergeants by PFT 
Score. A linear relationship reveals a lower Zone C PFT score is 
correlated to a higher 2P likelihood (Chi-Squared = 621; p-value < 0. 
01). The plot of logistic fit includes jittered data points (Red = 2P, 
Blue = Non-2P) for illustration, but does not represent separable data. 
3. Commander’s Recommendation 
The Commander’s Recommendation, xCORec , is a reenlistment recommendation by 
the Marine’s Commanding Officer captured in TFRS at the time of the RELM request. 
The ordinal variable xCORec  consists of four potential levels: 1 - Not Recommended, 2 - 







Recommended with Enthusiasm. These levels are ordinal where “Not Recommended” is 
the lowest level, coded as [1], and “Recommended with Enthusiasm” is the highest level, 
coded as [4]. Any missing values are coded as the mode, 4 – Recommended with 
Enthusiasm. For the regression, these ordinal levels are evaluated as continuous.  
To determine if the linear coding of levels is appropriate, logit( ) is plotted by 
Commander’s Recommendation level. The   of “Not Recommended” is equal to one, 
which is undefined in the logit, so the proportion is coded as 0.9999 to approximate an 
appropriate fit, revealing a reciprocal relationship, as shown in Figure 5. This suggests 
that a negative Commander’s Recommendation, level [1] or [2], has a much larger impact 
on the proportion twice-passed than positive recommendations, level [3] or [4]. This 
likely reflects a commander’s tendency to inflate evaluations for his or her own 
subordinates, making negative endorsements more significant. This is incorporated into 
model selection using a reciprocal transformation on the levels of xCORec . The univariate 
logistic regression on the reciprocal of xCORec  shows a reduced 2P likelihood as the 
recommendation improves, also shown in Figure 5.  
  
Figure 5.  Log-Odds (left) and Logistic Fit (right) of 2P Staff Sergeants by 
Commander’s Recommendation. The plot of log-odds reveals a 
reciprocal relationship where a lower Zone C Commander’s 
Recommendation is correlated to a higher 2P likelihood (Chi-Squared 
= 517; p-value < 0.01). The x-axis of the logistic fit has been reversed 
to keep lower recommendations on the left hand side of the axis. 
  
Fit of Reciprocal 
Transformation 
Reciprocal(xCORec ) [axis reversed]xCORec

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4. MCMAP Belt 
MCMAP belt qualification, xMCMAP , is not retained within TFRS, so these data 
fields are pulled from TFDW using the last level obtained prior to a Marine’s pre-
reenlistment EAS. The ordinal variable xMCMAP  has six potential levels: 1 – Unqualified, 
2 – Tan Belt, 3 – Grey Belt, 4 – Green Belt, 5 – Brown Belt, and 6 – Black Belt. These 
levels are coded as ordinal where “Unqualified” is the lowest level, coded as [1], and 
“Black Belt” is the highest level, coded as [6]. Instructor qualifications are not considered 
in the analysis. For the regression, these ordinal levels are evaluated as continuous. 
To determine if the linear coding of levels is appropriate, logit( ) is plotted by 
MCMAP belt level, revealing a logarithmic relationship, as shown in Figure 6. This 
suggests that lower MCMAP belt attainment has a larger impact on the proportion twice-
passed than higher belt attainment. This is incorporated into model selection using a 
logarithmic transformation on xMCMAP . The univariate logistic regression on the natural 
log of xMCMAP  shows a reduced 2P likelihood as the MCMAP level increases, also shown 
in Figure 6.  
  
Figure 6.  Log-Odds (left) and Logistic Fit (right) of 2P Staff Sergeants by 
MCMAP Belt. The plot of log-odds reveals a logarithmic relationship 
where lower MCMAP belt attainment is correlated to a higher 2P 
likelihood (Chi-Squared = 218; p-value < 0.01). The plot of logistic fit 
includes jittered data points (Red = 2P, Blue = Non-2P) for 
illustration, but does not represent separable data. 
  






5. Adverse Material (In-Grade and Prior)  
Adverse material in-grade, xAdverseInGrade , and adverse material prior to the rank of 
Staff Sergeant, xAdversePrior , are binary variables derived from TFDW data. The variable 
xAdverseInGrade  is coded as 1 (True) if the Marine has one or more non-judicial punishments 
(NJPs), summary courts-martial (SCM), or special courts-marital (SPCM) that occurred 
after promotion to Staff Sergeant but prior to a Marine’s pre-reenlistment EAS. The 
variable xAdversePrior  is coded as 1 (True) if the Marine has one or more NJPs or courts-
martial that occurred prior to ae Marine’s promotion to Staff Sergeant. Mosaic plots  
of the proportion of Staff Sergeants twice-passed by xAdverseInGrade  and xAdversePrior  show  
that adverse material is associated with a higher proportion twice-passed, as shown in 
Figure 7.  
  
Figure 7.  Mosaic Plot of 2P Staff Sergeants by Adverse Material (NJP, SCM, 
SPCM) in Grade and Prior (True/False). A smaller proportion of 
Zone C Staff Sergeants have adverse material in grade than prior 
ranks. Adverse material in grade (Likelihood Ratio Chi-Squared = 
345; p-value < 0.01) and prior (Likelihood Ratio Chi-Squared = 13; p-
value < 0.01) are correlated to a higher proportion of 2P Staff 
Sergeants. 
6. Body Composition 
Body composition measurements are conducted at least twice annually. Marines 
above the maximum weight for their height are measured, or taped, to determine their 
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body fat percentage; Marines within weight standards are not taped. The variable xTaped  is 
a binary variable and coded as 1 (True) if a body fat percentage is reported at Zone C 
reenlistment in the TFRS data. This does not necessarily mean the Marine is out of 
standards, as they might be within body fat standards; however, xTaped  will be true if any 
body fat measurement is reported. A mosaic plot of the proportion of Staff Sergeants 
twice-passed by xTaped  shows that being taped is associated with a higher proportion 
twice-passed, as shown in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8.  Mosaic Plot of 2P Staff Sergeants by Taped (True/False). Being above 
maximum body weight by height at the time of Zone C reenlistment 
correlates to a higher proportion of 2P Staff Sergeants (Likelihood 
Ratio Chi-Squared = 53, p-value < 0.01).  
7. Racial Identifier 
Racial identification, xRace(_) , is a nominal variable derived from the TFRS data 
with five potential levels: Asian, Black, White, Other, and Declined to Respond. Each 
level is modeled with a binary dummy variable, which is coded as 1 if true. The level 
Black, xRace(Black ) , is the only statistically significant level identified during model 
selection. A mosaic plot of the proportion of Staff Sergeants twice-passed by xRace(_)  
shows that Marines identified as black are associated with the highest proportion twice-
passed, as shown in Figure 9.  
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Figure 9.  Mosaic Plot of 2P Staff Sergeants by Racial Identifier. The subset of 
black Marines has the highest proportion of 2P Staff Sergeants. 
(Likelihood Ratio Chi-Squared = 32, p-value < 0.01). 
C. SUMMARY 
The ability to predict 2P likelihood allows the implementation of an effective 
quality screen during the reenlistment process, reducing the number of future 2P Staff 
Sergeants and improving the overall quality of the force. Model selection uses JMP Pro 
11 to conduct stepwise logistic regression resulting in eight variables being retained: 
, , , , , , , and . Chapter IV 
shows different selection criteria result in three distinct models: minimum Bayesian 
Information Criterion (Min-BIC), minimum Akaike Information Criterion (Min-AIC), 
and all terms with a p-value less than 0.05 (p-value). The Min-BIC and Min-AIC models 
are found using forward stepwise regression, which selects the variables resulting in a 
local minimum of BIC and AIC, respectively. The p-value model is found using 
backward stepwise regression, removing each variable that is not statistically significant 




xAFQT xPFT xCORec xMCMAP xAdverseInGrade xAdversePrior xTaped xRace(Black )
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IV. REGRESSION: TWICE-PASSED LIKELIHOOD 
The objective is to develop a model that can effectively predict 2P Staff Sergeants 
at the time of their Zone C reenlistment. This would enable a reduction in the number of 
2P Staff Sergeants by using a quality screen prior to a Marine reaching 15 years of 
service. The logistic regression model selected is the result of a min-BIC stepwise 
regression, and includes eight of the eighteen variables considered. Of these eight 
variables, PFT score, commander’s recommendation, and adverse material in grade are 
the most important in terms of response variability. Model validation shows the min-BIC 
model performs similarly to more complex models when evaluated against a test set. The 
insights derived from the logistic regression are valuable in evaluating a Marine’s quality 
at the time of Zone C reenlistment. 
A. MODEL SELECTION 
Within JMP, three potential models are created using stepwise regression: Min-
BIC, p-value, and Min-AIC. In comparing the three models, Min-BIC is the simplest 
model with eight variables and performs similarly to the other models in terms of R2, 
AIC, BIC, misclassification rate, and area under the curve (AUC) of the Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, as shown in Table 4.  As a result, the model from 
the min-BIC stepwise regression is selected to provide insight into predicting 2P Staff 
Sergeants. The JMP regression results for all three models are included in Appendix E. 
Table 4.   Comparison of Three Logistic Regression Models Using Stepwise 
Regression. Min-BIC is the simplest model with eight variables, but 
has a slightly higher misclassification rate and a slightly lower AUC. 





Min-BIC  8 0.143 7,599 7,660 < 0.0001 0.310 0.740 
p-value < 0.05 13 0.146 7,579 7,674 < 0.0001 0.305 0.744 
Min-AIC 16 0.147 7,578 7,693 < 0.0001 0.306 0.745 
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The ROC curve for the Min-BIC model illustrates the sensitivity and specificity 
of the model and reflects the goodness of fit. The Min-BIC model has an AUC of 0.740, 
with the ROC curve shown in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10.  ROC Curve for Min-BIC Model. Using 2P as the response of interest 
results in an AUC of 0.740. 
1. Regression Results 
Equation (3) shows the resulting model from the min-BIC stepwise logistic 
regression. Variables xPFT , xCORec , xMCMAP , and xAFQT  are treated as continuous variables, 
while xAdverseInGrade , xRace(Black ) , xTaped , and xAdversePrior  are dichotomous variables. 
Dichotomous variables evaluate to [1] if the condition is true and [0] otherwise.  
 
 




 1.22xAdverseInGrade  0.64 log(xMCMAP )
                       0.20xRace(Black )  0.009xAFQT  0.18xTaped  0.12xAdversePrior
  (3) 
 
Each of the variables in the final model is significant at the 0.05 level. Positive 
coefficients reflect a higher 2P likelihood when the value of the variable increases or is 
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true, specifically xAdverseInGrade , xRace(Black ) , xTaped , and xAdversePrior . Negative coefficients mean 
2P likelihood decreases as the value of the variable increases or is true, such as xPFT , 
xMCMAP , and xAFQT . The reciprocal transformation of xCORec  results in a large positive 
coefficient of 12.1 and requires a special interpretation. The reciprocal of xCORec  is always 
within the range of (0,1], so the impact of this term, and the 2P likelihood, is reduced as 
xCORec  increases. Additional details for each regressor are provided in Table 5.   
Table 5.   Model Term Coefficient Estimates, Standard Error, Statistical 
Significance, Odds-Ratios, and Variable Importance4. Each 
coefficient is rounded according to the corresponding standard error. 
Odds-ratios for continuous and ordinal terms are a comparison 
between the maximum and minimum values for that term, 
em MaxMin  .  







Intercept  3.3  0.4  75 < 0.0001 - - 
  – 0.017  0.001 346 < 0.0001  0.037 0.37 
    12.1  0.9 170 < 0.0001 8,730 0.23 
  1.22  0.09 172 < 0.0001 11.4 0.22 
 – 0.64  0.07  77 < 0.0001  0.32 0.07 
   0.20  0.03  34 < 0.0001  1.5 0.03 
  – 0.009  0.002  30 < 0.0001  0.5 0.03 
  0.18  0.04  25 < 0.0001  1.4 0.02 
  0.12  0.04  10  0.0012  1.3 0.01 
 
2. Regression Variables 
Variables xPFT , xMCMAP , and xAFQT  are all objective indicators of a Marine’s 
performance at the time of reenlistment; as the value of these variable increases, 2P 
likelihood decreases. PFT score, xPFT , is the most important variable in determining 
response variability with a variable importance of 0.37, which is the approximate 
                                                 
4 Variable importance is determined via JMP using independent resampled inputs of each term. JMP 
uses Monte Carlo runs to simulate the variability in predicted response based on variations of each factor, 










proportion of variance explained. PFT inclusion makes sense as a 2P predictor due to the 
Marine Corps focus on physical fitness. MCMAP belt attainment, xMCMAP , is significant, 
particularly if a Marine is unqualified or has a lower belt level at the time of reenlistment. 
Because MCMAP is largely a voluntary advancement program, this may be 
representative of a Marine’s intangible characteristics, such as motivation or drive. Even 
after 10 or more years in service, AFQT score, xAFQT , is still a significant predictor of 
success at this rank, where a higher score reflects a lower 2P likelihood. In addition to 
these objective indicators, Commander’s Recommendation is a strong 2P indicator. 
Commander’s Recommendation, xCORec , is the only subjective measure of 
performance included and is also positively correlated to promotion potential. Inclusion 
of subjective measures is important as a means of capturing the intangible qualities of an 
individual. Without available fitness report data, the Commander’s Recommendation is 
the only subjective measure available. The reciprocal of xCORec  is used in the model due 
to the stronger impact of negative recommendations, resulting in the largest odds-ratio of 
the selected variables. A negative recommendation from a Staff Sergeant’s Commanding 
Officer, “Not Recommended” or “Recommended with Reservation,” is a strong 2P 
predictor. A Staff Sergeant “Not Recommended” for reenlistment has 8,730 times higher 
odds of being 2P than one “Recommended with Enthusiasm.” The other impact of the 
reciprocal transformation is that the influence of the reciprocal term decreases as xCORec  
increases. This matches the results of the univariate analysis and reflects the emphasis 
that should be placed on a negative Commander’s Recommendation during reenlistment 
decisions.  
Variables xAdverseInGrade , xTaped , and xAdversePrior  are each unfavorable indicators of a 
Marine’s performance at the time of reenlistment and increase 2P likelihood when true. 
All adverse material is significant; however, adverse material in grade, xAdverseInGrade , has a 
much stronger relationship to being 2P with an odds-ratio of 11.4 compared to 1.3 for 
adverse material prior to the rank of Staff Sergeant, xAdversePrior . Marines above the 
maximum weight for their corresponding height, xTaped , also have a higher likelihood of 
being 2P. Although this does not necessarily mean they are out of standards, it reflects 
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the Marine Corps view on the importance of body composition. These variables are 
negatively correlated to a Marine’s future promotion potential. 
The inclusion of racial identifiers, specifically xRace(Black ) , as a significant predictor 
of 2P Staff Sergeants should give pause, as it is the only variable which is not related to 
individual performance. After controlling for the other terms in the model, the odds of a 
black Marine being 2P are 1.5 times greater than the odds of being 2P if the Marine is not 
black. It is likely that there are externalities not accounted for in this model; however, it is 
unclear that another variable would explain this apparent bias. Further, it is not possible 
to discern from the current data whether this bias derives from the retention, evaluation, 
or promotion processes. 
B. MODEL VALIDATION 
The selected model is validated using a test set, 20 percent of the original sample 
excluded at random during model development and selection. Using the established test 
set, the misclassification rate is evaluated and compared to that of the training set for each 
of the three developed models. In each of the models, there is an increase in 
misclassification of the test set of around 2.5 percentage points, as shown in Table 6.  A 
modest increase in the misclassification rate is expected, and this result confirms the 
similar performance of the three models. This helps to validate the selection of the Min-
BIC model for its simplicity and similar performance relative to the other tested models. 
Table 6.   Misclassification Rate Comparison Between Training and Test Sets. 
The misclassification rate for the test set increases by approximately 
2.5 percent for each of the models. 
Model 
Training Set 
(n = 6,557) 
Test Set 
(n = 1,594) 
Change in  
Misclass Rate 
Min-BIC (Selected) 0.310 0.334 0.024 
P-Value < 0.05 0.305 0.332 0.027 
Min-AIC 0.306 0.330 0.024 
 
In addition to evaluating overall misclassification rates, the models are tested for 
their ability to identify those Marines most likely to be 2P. Those Marines with the 
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highest 2P likelihood are those who would be denied reenlistment if this model were used 
as a quality screen. The percentage of Type I errors, or false positives, is a stronger 
measure of effectiveness for a model where it is more important to identify the lowest 
quality Marines. Type I error rates indicate the proportion of Marines erroneously 
identified as 2P at various quality screen levels, as shown in Figure 11. Type I error rates 
on the test set are lower than the overall misclassification rates. Although the Min-BIC 
misclassification rate is 0.334, the Type I error for a 20-percent quality screen is only 
0.269. Again, it is shown that the min-BIC model has similar performance to the more 
complex models created using min-AIC and p-value < 0.05 stepwise criteria. 
 
Figure 11.  Type I Error Identifying 2P Staff Sergeants in the Test Set. Three 
models are evaluated for their ability to predict 2P Staff Sergeants as a 
quality screen during Zone C reenlistments. Type I Error increases as 
the percent reduction in approved reenlistments is increased. A 20-
percent quality screen results in a Type I error rate of 0.269 for the 
Min-BIC model. 
C. SUMMARY 
This analysis identifies predictors of performance as they relate to 2P likelihood. 
The logistic regression results suggest that low PFT scores, negative commander’s 
recommendations, and adverse material in grade should be strongly considered when 
making retention decisions, but the results also show some of the difficulties of projecting 
2P Staff Sergeants at the time of reenlistment. Even for a quality screen that is attempting 
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to identify only the bottom 20 percent of performers, 26.9 percent of those identified 
would incorrectly predicted as 2P. This does not mean a Zone C quality screen cannot 
provide value, but that a quality screen will not result in a one-to-one reduction in 2P 
Staff Sergeants for each Marine separated. Although there is potential to improve this 
model with the future inclusion of fitness report data, there would still be a non-zero 
misclassification rate. For the purpose of policy comparison, the Type I error rates 
associated with the Min-BIC model are used in the following chapters as a reasonable 
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V. MARKOV MODELS: ENLISTED PROMOTIONS 
This analysis uses a Markov model to determine the impact of 2P Staff Sergeant 
policy alternatives on the enlisted promotion system. Markov models must meet three 
primary assumptions: the system consists of finite states, the probability of transition to 
the next state depends only on the current state (the Markov property), and the system has 
stationary transition probabilities (Bartholomew, Forbes, & McClean, 1991). In the 
military, it is rare that transition rates in the promotion system are stationary due to the 
fluid nature of personnel policy and inventory targets. With a target end strength of 
182,000 Marines, FY17 will be the first year since FY06 without a target increase or 
decrease in end strength (A.C. Fitzgerald, MPP-20, personal communication, 4 April 
2015). DMDC and MPP-20 are the sources of data used for this analysis. The objective is 
to evaluate the efficacy of retention policy alternatives and their impact on the promotion 
system.5 
The use of historical wastage rates and future inventory targets is a common 
requirement in manpower policy. This study uses optimization to determine the necessary 
steady-state recruitment and promotion rates, minimizing the sum of squared error 
between the target inventory and the calculated steady-state inventory. The use of 
recruitment and promotion rates as the decision variables simulates the military’s 
promote-to-vacancy system. This method of analysis, using Markov models and 
optimization, addresses the issue of pairing historical rates and future inventories.  
A. MARKOV MODEL 
The transition matrix, P, for the Markov model establishes annual transition, or 
promotion, probabilities from grade i to grade j, as shown in Equation (4), where Xt  
represents the state of the system at time t. The wastage matrix, W, establishes annual 
transition probabilities from grade i to absorption state k, attrition or retirement, as shown 
                                                 
5 Chapters V and VI are a continuation of work done in collaboration with Abbie J. Merkl in support 
of requirements for OS4701 – Manpower and Personnel Models, Naval Postgraduate School. Merkl 
contributed to variable definition, establishing historic transition rates, model validation, and optimization 
formulation. 
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in Equation (5). The model is structured such that each individual remains in the same 
grade, promotes, or leaves the system, resulting in Equation (6) (Bartholomew, Forbes, & 
McClean, 1991). These equations serve as the basis for the model development. 
 P  pi, j   P Xt1  j | Xt  i     (4) 





  1 , i   (6) 
In this analysis, the primary modification from a traditional promotion model is 
that the rank of Staff Sergeant is split into two states, E6 and 2P E6, where the E6 state 
does not include any 2P Staff Sergeants. The analysis and policy implementation will 
focus on these two states. A number of additional simplifications are made for ease of 
understanding the model as depicted in Figure 12 and Table 7.  Demotions are not 
considered at any grade. The Marine Corps does not distinguish between grades E1, E2, 
and E3 for inventory targets, so these grades are combined into one state, E1-E3, and all 
recruitment flows into this state. Although grades E1 to E5 have a small number of 
retirements and grade E7 to E9 have some level of attrition, a distinction for the type of 
wastage is unnecessary outside of the E6 and 2P E6 states, which is the focus of analysis. 
All Staff Sergeant retirements are assumed to be from the 2P E6 state, since it is unlikely 
for a Staff Sergeant to reach retirement eligibility without two promotion opportunities.  
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Figure 12.  Markov Model for Marine Corps Enlisted Promotions with 2P E6 
Transitions. The primary modification from a traditional promotion 
process is the addition of a 2P E6 state. 
Table 7.   Markov Transition Matrix for Marine Corps Enlisted Promotions 
with 2P E6 Transitions. The primary modification from a traditional 




Data used for the Markov model is derived from three sources: DMDC, MPP-20, 
and the Marine Corps Grade Adjusted Recapitulation (GAR). DMDC provides details on 
annual transitions by grade, which is used to establish historical wastage rates. MPP-20 
provides data on Gunnery Sergeant promotion boards and the inventory of 2P Staff 
Sergeants, which establishes a basis for 2P E6 state transitions and inventory. The GAR 
publishes the annual Marine Corps inventory targets by grade and MOS. The data 
available is sufficient to create a steady-state model via optimization. 
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1. Defense Manpower Data Center  
Manpower policies are rarely, if ever, given time to reach a steady state; any time 
target end strength changes, it impacts transition and wastage rates from all grades. The 
DMDC data, reference DRS86912, includes historical personnel flows for recruitment, 
promotion, demotion, attrition, and retirement. Although transition data is available 
through FY14, the objective is to compare policy alternatives in a steady-state 
environment. For this reason, wastage rates are estimated using only data from FY04 
through FY06, which is prior to the FY07 increase in target end strength and subsequent 
drawdown. This provides an approximation for wastage rates in a steady-state 
environment. The DMDC data does not include information on the 2P E6 state or 
inventory targets, and it must be supplemented by additional sources. 
2. MPP-20 
MPP-20 provides historical data for Gunnery Sergeant promotion boards and 2P 
Staff Sergeant inventories. The analysis of previous Gunnery Sergeant promotion boards 
includes the size and composition of the eligible Staff Sergeant population and those 
selected for promotion. This is used to derive the annual flow from E6 to 2P E6 and from 
2P E6 to E7. Similar to the use of FY04 to FY06 historical wastage rates, it is assumed 
that the 2P E6 state transitions from this period are a good approximation for future 
steady-state 2P E6 transition rates. The inventory of 2P Staff Sergeants, also provided by 
MPP-20, establishes a basis for estimating the proportion of 2P E6 in the total Staff 
Sergeant inventory. From FY03 through FY14, 2P Staff Sergeants represent 15.7 percent 
of the total Staff Sergeant inventory, with a 1.6 percent standard deviation, as shown in 
Figure 13.  
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Figure 13.  Proportion of 2P and Non-2P Staff Sergeants by Fiscal Year. The 
historical proportion of 2P Staff Sergeants is 15.7±1.6 percent from 
FY03-FY14 Staff Sergeant end strength. 
3. Grade Adjusted Recapitulation 
The Marine Corps publishes inventory targets by grade and MOS twice per year 
through the GAR. GAR inventory targets are referenced by target year and a letter 
designation representing the date published; for example, the 2017PP GAR indicates the 
FY17 inventory targets published in Spring 2015, designated by the code PP. For this 
analysis, the 2017PP GAR targets are selected as the initial inventory and target steady-
state conditions for the base-case model, as FY17 end-strength targets will remain 
stationary for the foreseeable future.  
C. VARIABLES 
To adequately compare retention policy alternatives, this analysis evaluates the 
impact of these policies under steady-state inventory conditions. Steady-state inventory, 
in this sense, is not limited to just total end strength, but also end strength by grade. As a 
basis for comparison, a base-case Markov model uses historical wastage rates during a 
period inventory when inventory was relatively constant. This assumes retention policies 
during the last stable inventory period would result in wastage rates similar to those of 
future stable inventory periods. The last period when Marine Corps inventories were 
stable, from which to derive wastage rates, was from FY04 to FY06. Target inventories 
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have been in a state of fluctuation since FY06, and the next period of stable inventory 
targets is expected to begin in FY17. The base-case model pairs FY17 inventory targets 
with historical wastage rates. The variables of interest for the base-case model 
optimization include inventory, recruitment, transition, and wastage data, as defined in 
Table 8.  The optimization of decision variables establishes the base-case enlisted 
promotion model and provides a basis for evaluating policy alternatives. 
Table 8.   Indices, Sets, Data, and Decision Variables for the Base-Case 
Optimization. The indices refer to the transition and wastage 
matrices from Table 7.   
 Notation Description 
Index and  
Set Use 
i Grade at time t 
j Grade or state at time t + 1 
k Wastage at time t + 1 
P = {pi,j} Transition matrix 
I Identity matrix 
Derived  
Data 
n0 Initial inventory 
r Recruitment vector 
pE6,2P Transition probability from E6 to 2P E6 
p2P,E7 Transition probability from 2P E6 to E7 
wE3,ATT Wastage probability from E1-E3 to Attrition 
wE4,ATT Wastage probability from E4 to Attrition 
wE5,ATT Wastage probability from E5 to Attrition 
w2P,RET Wastage probability from 2P E6 to Retirement 
wE7,RET Wastage probability from E7 to Retirement 
wE8,RET Wastage probability from E8 to Retirement 
wE9,RET Wastage probability from E9 to Retirement 
ssgt_attrition Total Staff Sergeant wastage probability  
from E6 and 2P E6 to Attrition 
Decision  
Variables 
R Total recruitment 
pi,i Same state transition probabilities 
pE3,E4 Transition probability from E1-E3 to E4 
pE4,E5 Transition probability from E4 to E5 
pE5,E6 Transition probability from E5 to E6 
pE6,E7 Transition probability from E6 to E7 
pE7,E8 Transition probability from E7 to E8 
pE8,E9 Transition probability from E8 to E9 
wE6,ATT Wastage probability from E6 to Attrition 
w2P,ATT Wastage probability from 2P E6 to Attrition 
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1. Inventory and Recruitment Vectors 
The recruitment vector, r, establishes the proportion of recruits entering each 
grade, or state. For this model, recruits enter only the E1-E3 state. The number of 
recruits, R, is constant year over year and determined using optimization. The initial 
inventory vector, n0, is derived using the 2017PP GAR targets and the mean historical 
proportion of 2P Staff Sergeants from FY03-FY14. The 2017PP GAR also establishes the 
target inventory for the system to reach at steady state, where the E6 and 2P E6 states 
combine for the total Staff Sergeant target. The recruitment, initial inventory, and target 
inventory vectors are shown in Table 9.   
Table 9.   Inventory and Recruitment Vectors. The recruitment vector 
designates that all recruits, R, enter the E1-E3 state. The initial 
inventory is derived from the 2017PP GAR and historical 2P 
proportions. The 2017PP GAR establishes the target inventory. 
 E1-E3 E4 E5 E6 2P E6 E7 E8 E9 
Recruitment 
Vector (r) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Initial Inventory 
(n0) 
68,652 37,308 26,185 12,802 2,384 8,338 3,837 1,582 
2017PP GAR 
Target Inventory  68,652 37,308 26,185 15,186 8,338 3,837 1,582 
 
2. Transition Matrix 
The transition matrix, P, consists of annual transition probabilities, pi,j., between 
grades. The probability of demotion from any grade is set to zero, and promotions only 
occur one grade at a time. This analysis uses optimization to determine the promotion 
rates required to maintain the steady-state inventory; however, the transitions from E6 to 
2P E6 (pE6,2P) and from 2P E6 to E7 (p2P,E7) must be estimated using historical data. 
These probabilities are approximated using Equation (7), where nti , j  is the annual 
personnel flow from state i to state j in fiscal year t, and nti  is the end strength of state i 
in fiscal year t (Bartholomew, Forbes, & McClean, 1991).  
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 ,  t (FY04,FY05,FY06) (7) 
An analysis of FY04 through FY06 Gunnery Sergeant Promotion Board results and 
DMDC data establish the personnel flows required. This period is used because it is the 
last time period without a targeted increase or decrease in overall end strength, which 
would impact transition and wastage rates. The resulting transition rates and standard 
deviations are pE6,2P = 0.07 0.02 and p2P,E7 = 0.13 0.01. Although standard deviations 
are provided for historical transition rates, the analysis uses only the mean rate. 
3. Wastage Matrix 
The wastage matrix, W, is comprised of attrition and retirement probabilities for 
each grade and is derived from the DMDC data. For simplification, all wastage for grades 
E1 through E5 is included in the attrition flows, and all wastage for grades E7 through E9 
is included in the retirement flows. For the E6 and 2P E6 wastage rates, all Staff Sergeant 
retirements are assumed to be from the 2P E6 state. These simplifications do not impact 
the desired measures of effectiveness surrounding the E6 and 2P E6 states. The wastage 
probabilities are estimated using Equation (8), with a similar definition similar to that of 
Equation (7). 






 ,  t (FY04,FY05,FY06) (8) 
The total attrition rate for Staff Sergeants, ssgt_attrition, is determined using Equation  
(8), where k=ATT and the flows available from DMDC, ni,k, are for the total Staff 
Sergeant population. Variables wE6,ATT and w2P,ATT are evaluated during optimization 
using Equation (9) as a constraint, where ssgt_attrition = 0.071 0.003.  
 n0E6 wE6,ATT +n02P w2P,ATT = n0E6 +n02P * ssgt_attrition   (9) 
The resulting wastage rates are shown in Table 10.   

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Table 10.   Historical Wastage Probabilities And Standard Deviations By 
Grade. DMDC data is used to estimate the probability of attrition 
and retirement from each state. E6 and 2P E6 attrition are 
determined through optimization. 








0.007 ssgt_attrition - - - 
Retirement 
(wi,RET) 








D. ENLISTED PROMOTION MODEL BASE CASE 
The base-case model of the enlisted promotion process uses optimization to 
determine the recruitment and promotion rates required to achieve the targeted 2017PP 
GAR inventory, as shown in Figure 14 and Table 11.  The results of the base case are the 
foundation by which to model potential policy changes. Changes in personnel policy can 
be modeled by determining specific wastage or transition rates being targeted by the 
policy. Targeted changes to these rates are used to evaluate the impact of policy 
implementation.  
 
Figure 14.  Markov Model for Base-Case Optimization with Fixed Inventory. The 
red dashed lines represent decision variables, which are determined 
through optimization. The black solid lines are derived data from 
FY04 through FY06.  
  
   
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Table 11.   Markov Transition Matrix for Base-Case Optimization with Fixed 
Inventory. The red dashed lines represent decision variables, which 
are determined through optimization. The black solid lines are 
derived data from FY04 through FY06, showing calculated rates and 
standard deviations for historical rates. 
 
 
1. Base-Case Optimization Formulation 
The base-case optimization formulation uses the notation, indices, sets, derived 
data, and decision variables established in Table 8.  The objective for the base-case 
optimization, Equation (10), is to minimize the sum of squared differences between the 
steady-state inventory and the inventory targets by grade. The target inventory is the 
same as the initial inventory, but the E6 and 2P E6 states are combined to minimize the 
squared difference for the total number of Staff Sergeants. The full formulation includes 
Equations (10) through (13). 
  






 Rr I P 1 
E 6
 Rr I P 1 
2P
 n0E 6  n02 P  2 , j  E6,2P  (10) 




  1,  i        (11) 
n0E6 wE6,ATT +n02P w2P,ATT = n0E6 +n02P * ssgt_attrition    (12) 
pi , j  0;  wi,k  0;  R  0       (13) 
 
The first constraint, Equation (11), ensures that the probabilities of transition or wastage 
from each state sum to one. The second constraint, Equation (12), forces the attrition 
from the E6 and 2P E6 states to total Staff Sergeant attrition. The third constraint, 
Equation (13), establishes that transition rates, wastage rates, and recruitment are 
positive. 
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2. Base Case Results 
The optimal value of the base-case optimization is zero, meaning there is no 
difference between the steady-state inventory and the initial inventory; a stable promotion 
system is achieved. Equation (14) shows the calculation for the steady-state inventory of 
the system, n* (Bartholomew, Forbes, & McClean, 1991). 
   (14) 
In addition to achieving the target inventory, the steady-state inventory for the base-case 
model achieves the appropriate historical proportion of 2P Staff Sergeants, 15.7 percent 
of the total Staff Sergeant inventory, as shown in Table 12.   
Table 12.   Base-Case Optimization for Steady-State Inventory. The result of the 
optimization is a stable promotion system with no change from 
initial to steady-state inventory. 2P E6 is 15.7 percent of the total 
inventory of Staff Sergeants. 
 E1-E3 E4 E5 E6 2P E6 E7 E8 E9 
Steady-State 
Inventory (n*) 68,652 37,308 26,185 12,802 2,384 8,338 3,837 1,582 
 
The optimal solution for the model provides the promotion rates for each state that are 
required to maintain the steady-state inventory, as shown in Table 13.  Wastage rates for 
the base case from E6 and 2P E6 to Attrition are established as wE6,ATT = 0.07 and w2P,ATT 
= 0.09. The number of recruits, R, required to enter the system each year is 30,320.  
n* Rr(I P)1
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Table 13.   Markov Transition Matrix Resulting from Base-Case Optimization. 
The results show transition rates required to maintain steady-state 
inventory for the base-case scenario. Due to rounding, rows may not 




The results of the base-case model show a stable model that successfully reaches 
the target inventory, providing a foundation for policy analysis. This enables policy 
comparisons in terms of promotion rates, wastage rates, inventory impacts, and 
recruitment requirements. Specifically, these impacts are evaluated for a quality screen at 
reenlistment and a non-retention policy for 2P Staff Sergeants. The objective is to 
evaluate the efficacy of 2P retention policy alternatives and their impact on the promotion 
system. The evaluation of quality screen and non-retention policy models in Chapter VI 
reveals the impact of these policies under steady-state inventory conditions. 
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VI. MARKOV MODELS: POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
This analysis uses the base-case enlisted promotions model to compare retention 
policy alternatives and determine their impact on the inventory and promotion system. 
This study considers two alternatives to the base case: a quality screen at the time of Zone 
C reenlistment and a policy of non-retention of 2P Staff Sergeants. These alternatives can 
be realized in the Markov model through the modification of targeted transition and 
wastage rates, establishing new recruitment and promotion rates through optimization. A 
quality screen is more effective than the non-retention policy at reducing the proportion 
of Staff Sergeants who transition to the 2P E6 state, however, the non-retention policy, is 
more effective at reducing the 2P Staff Sergeants in the steady-state inventory.  
A. ZONE C QUALITY SCREEN 
The first policy alternative considered is a quality screen at the time of Zone C 
reenlistment. A quality screen is a reduction in the number of approved reenlistments, 
applying screening criteria to reduce the number of likely 2P Staff Sergeants. An 
illustration of the quality screen Markov model is shown in Figure 15.  
 
Figure 15.  Markov Model for Quality Screen at Reenlistment. An increase in 
reenlistment selectivity is modeled as an increase in the E6 attrition 
rate and a decrease in the probability of transition from E6 to 2P E6. 
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The historical proportion of the total Staff Sergeant inventory that reenlists 
through an approved Zone C request is approximately 12 percent. A quality screen 
reduces this reenlistment rate, and optimization provides the required recruitment and 
promotion rates under this policy alternative. The optimization formulation is similar to 
that of the base case, with relevant variables defined in Table 14.   
Table 14.   Indices, Sets, Data, and Decision Variables for Policy Alternative 
Optimizations. For the policy alternatives, wastage rates are derived 
from the base-case results. 
 Notation Description 
Index and  
Set Use 
i Grade at time t 
j Grade or state at time t + 1 
k Wastage at time t + 1 
P = {pi,j} Transition matrix 
I Identity matrix 
Derived  
Data 
W = {wi,k} Wastage matrix 
n0 Initial inventory 
r Recruitment vector 
pE6,2P Transition probability from E6 to 2P E6 
p2P,E7 Transition probability from 2P E6 to E7 
Decision  
Variables 
R Total recruitment 
pi,i Same state transition probabilities 
pE3,E4 Transition probability from E1-E3 to E4 
pE4,E5 Transition probability from E4 to E5 
pE5,E6 Transition probability from E5 to E6 
pE6,E7 Transition probability from E6 to E7 
pE7,E8 Transition probability from E7 to E8 
pE8,E9 Transition probability from E8 to E9 
 
1. Variables 
As discussed in Chapter IV, there is some Type I error rate associated with any 
screening criteria, . The variable qScreen% is the percent reduction in 
approved reenlistments for a given quality screen level. For instance, a 20-percent quality 
screen has an errorRate20% of 0.269. The quality screen uses an effective 2P reduction 
rate, reductRate, as defined by Equation (15). As the level of the quality screen 
increases, the Type I error rate for a quality screen increases, and reductRate is reduced. 
errorRateqScreen%
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 reductRate  qScreen%* 1 errorRateqScreen%   (15) 
For the quality screen, inventory and recruitment vectors remain the same as the 
base case. There are two transition rates that are the primary emphasis of the policy, 
 and . The implementation of a quality screen results in a 
reduction in the transition rate from E6 to 2P E6, pE6,2PqualityScreen . This rate is determined in a 
fashion similar to that of the base case. The flow from E6 to 2P E6 is reduced according 
to the effectiveness of the quality screen, as shown in Equation (16), where napprRELM is 
the number of approved reenlistments from the base case and nti , j  and n ti  are as 
previously defined. For the steady-state inventory, a reenlistment rate of 12 percent 




  napprRELM *reductRateqScreen%
n(t1)E 6
t
 ,  t (FY04,FY05,FY06)  (16) 
For a 20-percent quality screen, pE6,2PqualityScreen  = 0.06. The transition rate from 2P E6 to E7 
is assumed to remain unchanged from the base case, p2P,E7 = 0.13. 
To achieve the reduction in the E6 to 2P E6 transition rate, a quality screen targets 
an increase in the wastage rate of E6 to Attrition from the base case. This wastage rate, 
wE6,ATTqualityScreen , is calculated using Equation (17), where wE6,ATTbaseCase  is the optimal result for 
wE6,ATT from the base case, or 0.07, and reenlRate is the historical proportion of the total 
Staff Sergeant inventory that reenlists through an approved Zone C request, 
approximately 0.12. 
wE6,ATTqualityScreen  wE6,ATTbaseCase  qScreen%*reenlRate (17) 
For a 20-percent quality screen, this results in wE6,ATTqualityScreen  = 0.09. All other wastage 
rates are fixed to the results of the base-case model.   
The implementation of a quality screen will result in a reduction of both 2P and 
non-2P Staff Sergeants. For instance, a 20-percent quality screen reduces approved Zone 
pE6,2PqualityScreen wE6,ATTqualityScreen
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C reenlistments by 365 annually compared to the base case and has an errorRate20% of 
0.269, indicating 98 Staff Sergeants are incorrectly identified as destined to become 2P. 
The efficiency of a quality screen continues to decrease until the number of non-2P Staff 
Sergeants separated exceeds the number of 2P Staff Sergeants separated. The quality 
screen model is evaluated for efficiency at levels from zero to 100 percent, with the 
results shown in Figure 16. For policy comparison purposes, the quality screen level is set 
to 20 percent.  
 
Figure 16.  2P and Non-2P Staff Sergeants Denied Further Service Using Zone C 
Quality Screen. A 20-percent reduction in approvals results in 267 
correctly identified 2P Staff Sergeants and 98 Non-2P Staff Sergeants 
incorrectly identified.  
2. Quality Screen Results 
For the policy alternatives, the optimization objective, Equation (18), remains the 
same as the base case, minimizing the sum of squared differences between the target 
inventory and the steady-state inventory. Two of the three constraints, Equations (19) and 
(20), also remain as fundamental constraints of a Markov model. Wastage rates for E6 
and 2P E6 attrition are not recalculated, as they are derived prior to the quality screen 
optimization. The full formulation for the policy alternatives optimization includes 




s.t.        (19) 
      (20) 
The calculated wastage rates and E6 transition rates are paired with the 2017PP 
GAR initial inventory, n0, to determine the recruitment and promotion rates required to 
reach a steady-state system. The result of the optimization of Equations (18) through (20) 
is a stable system with zero difference between the steady-state and target inventories. 
The results of a 20-percent quality screen optimization are shown in Table 15.   
Table 15.   Markov Transition Matrix for Twenty-Percent Quality Screen Model 
Results. The red fills are the rates targeted by the policy. The red-
dotted lines are optimization results. 
 
 
B. 2P NON-RETENTION POLICY 
In addition to evaluating the impact of a quality screen on the promotion system, a 
policy of non-retention for 2P Staff Sergeants is evaluated. For the non-retention policy, 
all 2P Staff Sergeants are denied further service following their second pass for 
promotion, increasing the wastage rate from 2P E6 to Attrition, as shown in Figure 17.   






 Rr I P 1 
E 6
 Rr I P 1 
2P
 n0E 6  n02 P  2 , j  E6,2P




  1,  i
pi, j  0;  wi,k  0;  R  0
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Figure 17.  Markov Model for Non-Retention Policy. Separation of 2P Staff 
Sergeants is modeled as an increase in transition probability from 2P 
E6 to Attrite and elimination of the transition from 2P E6 to E7, 
Retirement, and back to 2P E6. 
The mean TIS at the time of a 2P Staff Sergeant’s second pass is 13.5   1.7 years 
standard deviation for the FY07–FY11 Zone C reenlistment population, as shown in 
Figure 18. The average TIS for Zone C reenlistments is around 12 years, but only 
17 percent of 2P Staff Sergeants have received their second pass at this point in their 
career. Sixty-three percent have been twice passed by 14 years, 93 percent by 16 years, 
and 99 percent by 18 years. Only 1 percent of 2P Staff Sergeants have reached retirement 
sanctuary prior to receiving their second pass. 
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Figure 18.  Years Of Service At A Staff Sergeant’s Second Pass For Promotion. 
The mean time in service prior to becoming a 2P Staff Sergeant is 13.5 
years with 1.7 years standard deviation. Data is derived from the 
FY07–FY11 Zone C reenlistment population. 
1. Variables 
In this analysis, there is no consideration for retirement sanctuary, and all 2P E6 
are separated the year after reaching the 2P E6 state. The advantage of this type of policy 
is that it explicitly targets the 2P E6 state, so there is no error rate in identification. To 
model this policy, the optimization formulation is the same as the quality screen. The 
wastage rate from 2P E6 to Attrition, w2P,ATTnonRetention , is 100 percent. This reduces the 
wastage rate from 2P E6 to Retirement, w2P,RETnonRetention , to zero percent and forces the 2P 
E6 to E7 transition rate, p2P,E7nonRetention , to zero percent as well. All other wastage rates and 
the transition rate from E6 to 2P E6, pE6,2P , are fixed to the result of the base-case model.  
2. Non-Retention Results 
The calculated wastage rates and 2P E6 transition rates are paired with the 
2017PP GAR initial inventory, n0, to determine the recruitment and promotion rates 
required to reach a steady-state system. The result of the optimization from Equations 
(18) through (20) is a stable system with zero difference between the steady-state and 
target inventories. The results of the non-retention policy optimization are shown in 
Table 16.   
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Table 16.   Markov Transition Matrix for Non-Retention Policy Model. The red 




C. POLICY COMPARISONS 
A review of the two alternative policies against the base case shows that a quality 
screen is more effective at reducing the percentage of Staff Sergeants that reach the 2P 
E6 state. Using a 20-percent quality screen, the percent of all Staff Sergeants who reach 
the 2P E6 state is reduced from 24.8 percent in the base case to 20.8 percent for the 
quality screen. This compares to 24.1 percent for non-retention policy. In addition to a 
decrease in the proportion of Staff Sergeants who become 2P, these policies impact the 
inventory of 2P Staff Sergeants, average TIG, promotion rates, and vary in 
implementation. 
1. Inventory of Twice-Passed Staff Sergeants 
The steady-state inventory of 2P E6 is most significantly impacted by the non-
retention policy, with a 59.7 percent reduction from the base case compared to a 9.4 
percent reduction for a quality screen. This reduction in 2P E6 inventory requires an 
additional 505 recruits annually for the non-retention policy and an additional 276 
recruits annually for the quality screen. The total number of Staff Sergeants at steady 
state remains constant across all three policies; however, the non-retention policy reduces 
the percentage of 2P E6 to 6.8 percent of all Staff Sergeants, as shown in Figure 19.  
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Figure 19.  Impact of Policy Changes on Steady-State E6 and 2P E6 Inventory. A 
20-percent quality screen results in a 9.4 percent reduction in 2P E6 
from the base case. A policy of non-retention results in a 59.7 percent 
reduction in 2P E6. 
2. Average Time In Grade  
The average TIG for each rank is compared across the three policies. The only 
two grades that experience an appreciable change in average TIG are Sergeants and Staff 
Sergeants. The average TIG reduction for Sergeants is due to an increase in promotion 
rate, whereas, the reduction for Staff Sergeants is primarily due to fewer 2P E6, who tend 
to remain in that state for longer periods of time. These results derive from Equation (21), 
where S is the fundamental matrix and si,j is the expected time spent in state j, given a 
starting point of state i (Bartholomew, Forbes, & McClean, 1991). 
 S  I P 1   (21) 
The average TIG for all Staff Sergeants is 4.4 years, 4.0 years, and 3.8 years for the base 
case, quality screen, and non-retention policies, respectively, as shown in Figure 20.  
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Figure 20.  Impact of Policy Changes on Average TIG. For Staff Sergeants, 
average TIG is reduced from 4.4 years to 3.8 years with a 2P non-
retention policy. Sergeants (E5) experience the only other significant 
reduction in average TIG, which goes from 3.2 years in the base case 
to 3.0 years for the non-retention policy. 
3. Promotion Rates 
The increased level of attrition from the Staff Sergeant rank, for both the quality 
screen and non-retention policies, has the effect of increasing the rate of promotion for 
the lower ranks. The largest increases in promotion rates for each grade are as a result of 
the non-retention policy. The grade of E5 has the largest change in annual promotion rate, 
which goes from 13.3 percent in the base case to 14.3 percent for the quality screen and 
15.2 percent for the non-retention policy, as shown in Figure 21. Staff Sergeants and 
above do not experience an increase in promotion rate.  
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Figure 21.  Impact of Policy Changes on Annual Promotion Rates. The first three 
states experience an increase in promotion rate using either a quality 
screen or a 2P non-retention policy. The non-retention policy has a 
greater impact on promotion rates. 
4. Implementation 
While the intent is to compare steady-state results, retention policies do not 
immediately reach steady state. The annual inventory following a change in policy is 
calculated using Equation (22), where nt is the inventory at time t, and P, R, and r are as 
previously defined (Bartholomew, Forbes, & McClean, 1991). 
   (22) 
The differences between the actual and steady-state values immediately following 
implementation are slight for the quality screen, with only a 0.2 percent difference 
between the target and actual Staff Sergeant inventories the year immediately following 
implementation. This shortfall cascades through the higher grades of E7, E8, and E9. For 
a 20-percent quality screen, the largest shortfall is less than 0.3 percent, as shown in 
Figure 22.  
nt  nt1P Rr
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Figure 22.  Target Inventory Shortfalls Following Policy Implementation. The 
implementation of a quality screen results in a Staff Sergeant shortfall 
of less than 0.3 percent. 
For a non-retention policy, the systematic change is more significant than for a 
quality screen, resulting in greater inventory shortfalls following implementation. For the 
non-retention policy, if steady-state promotion rates are used, the attrition of all 2P E6 
results in a shortfall of Staff Sergeants from the target inventory, 7.4 percent immediately 
following implementation. This shortfall is reduced to less than 1 percent after the year 6 
of the policy; however, the shortfall cascades through the higher grades of E7, E8, and 
E9. It takes more than 15 years for the E8 shortfall and more than 20 years for the E9 
shortfall to drop below 1 percent, as shown in Figure 23. In a promote-to-vacancy 
system, the initial shortfall and subsequent cascade effect is addressed by increasing the 
initial promotion rate above the steady-state value to fill the vacancies. These shortfalls 
could also be mitigated through a more gradual implementation of the policy, which 




Figure 23.  Target Inventory Shortfalls During Non-Retention Policy 
Implementation. Immediately following implementation, there is a 
7.4 percent shortfall in Staff Sergeants. This shortfall cascades through 
the higher ranks for more than 20 years before reaching a steady-state 
inventory. 
D. SUMMARY 
If the objective is to reduce the number of 2P Staff Sergeants in the inventory, a 
policy that targets 2P Staff Sergeants, such as the non-retention policy, is significantly 
more effective than one that targets re-enlistees. A quality screen is less effective at 
reducing the number of 2P Staff Sergeants, due to the difficulty in projecting which Staff 
Sergeants will reach the 2P E6 state. However, if the objective is to reduce the percentage 
of Staff Sergeant who reach the 2P E6 state, a quality screen is more effective at 
identifying low performers than a first-come, first-serve reenlistment process. Both 
policies increase the promotion rates for junior grades and require a small increase in the 
number of recruits. Although it is not modeled here, a combination of these policies may 
prove to be the most effective at reducing the impact of 2P Staff Sergeants on the enlisted 
force. Chapter VII investigates the institutional cost associated with these alternatives. 
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VII. SIMULATION: INSTITUTIONAL COST OF 2P RETENTION 
In much of the debate surrounding the retention of 2P Staff Sergeants, the focus is 
on fairness to the individual; whereas, there is a lack of discussion on the impact of 2P 
Staff Sergeants on the Marine Corps as an institution. Three areas are considered in 
which 2P Staff Sergeants have an institutional cost: productivity loss, excess subordinate 
attrition, and retirement obligations. In the base case, a 2P Staff Sergeant inventory of 
2,384 results in estimated productivity losses of 2,770 50 FTEs, excess subordinate 
attrition of 339 6 Marines, and retirement obligations with a present value of $122.3
$0.2 million on an annual basis. These results provide an order of magnitude estimate of 
the institutional costs associated with the retention of 2P Staff Sergeants. The base-case 
institutional costs are evaluated against a 20-percent quality screen and a non-retention 
policy to determine potential savings. 
A. LEADERSHIP EFFECTS AND PRODUCTIVITY LOSS 
Productivity loss resulting from 2P Staff Sergeant retention is simulated as a 
function of individual leadership effect, which is a supervisor’s impact on unit 
performance or productivity. As introduced in Chapter II, existing literature reveals 
leadership effects varying from 4 to 40 percent across a range of industries (Goodall & 
Pogrebna, 2015). Although there is no attempt to determine the actual leadership effect of 
Staff Sergeants within the Marine Corps, estimates of leadership effect are used to 
develop an order of magnitude assessment for 2P unit productivity loss.  
Assuming Staff Sergeant performance is normally distributed, leadership effects 
are simulated for the total inventory of 15,168 Staff Sergeants using a random normal 
distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 15 percent. The result is an 
inventory in which the average Staff Sergeant has a baseline leadership effect of zero, a 
below-average Staff Sergeant has a negative leadership effect, and an above average Staff 
Sergeant has a positive leadership effect. With a standard deviation of 15 percent, Staff 
Sergeants in the bottom five percent of performers are almost 25 percent less productive 




distribution is generated for a single run of the simulation in Figure 24. A total of 10,000 
replications are completed for each simulation. 
 
Figure 24.  Sample Leadership Effects with 15-Percent Standard Deviation 
Simulated For 15,168 Staff Sergeants. Leadership effects are 
simulated using a normal distribution with a mean of zero. Using a 15-
percent standard deviation, the best and worst performers would have 
approximately a 50 percent increase or decrease in team productivity, 
respectively. 
This analysis assumes the average team size is the same for 2P and non-2P Staff 
Sergeants. Based on the pyramidal structure of the 2017PP GAR, each Staff Sergeant 
supervises an average of 4.5 junior Marines (E1–E3), 2.5 Corporals (E4), and 
1.7 Sergeants (E5), which is an average team size of 9.7 including the Staff Sergeant. 
Using this assumption, 2P Staff Sergeants supervise more than 20,500 Marines, as shown 
in Figure 25.  
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Figure 25.  Illustration of 2P Staff Sergeants and Subordinates for the Base Case. 
2P Staff Sergeants will have a proportional impact on the rest of the 
chain of command. In the base case, this includes more than 20,500 
junior Marines and Non-Commissioned Officers based on 2017PP 
GAR target inventories. 
The average Staff Sergeant is assumed to get 40 man-hours of productivity from 
each member of his or her team each week. The leadership effect of zero corresponds to 
388 man-hours of weekly productivity for an average team size of 9.7 Marines. Unit 
productivity loss for an individual Staff Sergeant, productivityLossi, is calculated using 
Equation (23), where leadershipEffecti is the individual leadership effect and 
teamProductivityave is the average team productivity in man-hours for all Staff Sergeants. 
 productivityLossi  leadershipEffecti * teamProductivityave   (23) 
Evaluating the relative performance of 2P Staff Sergeants compared to the rest of 
the inventory of Staff Sergeant is a challenge. The inventory includes newly promoted 
Staff Sergeants, as well as Staff Sergeants who attrite prior to promotion eligibility, 
whose long-term performance is difficult to determine. The initial assessment of 
productivity loss uses conservative assumptions of 15-percent standard deviation in 
leadership effects and below-average performance from 2P Staff Sergeant relative to the 
full inventory. To simulate below-average performance, leadership effects for each 2P 
Staff Sergeant are randomly selected from the lower half of the previously simulated 
leadership effects for the inventory. Unit productivity loss is calculated for all simulated 
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2P Staff Sergeants. The result is an average 2P productivity loss of 46.5 man-hours per 
week with a standard deviation of 0.8 man-hours, as shown in Figure 26.  
 
Figure 26.  Average Unit Productivity Loss Per 2P Staff Sergeant. Assuming 
below-average performance from 2P Staff Sergeants and 15-percent 
standard deviation in the leadership effect, each 2P Staff Sergeant 
causes an average of 46.5 0.8 man-hours of productivity loss per 
week. 
1. Sensitivity Analysis 
There is no available data on the actual impact that a Staff Sergeant has on unit 
productivity, so any measure of productivity loss is subject to variation based on the 
assumed deviation among leadership effects. A small standard deviation suggests either 
similar performance among Staff Sergeants. As the standard deviation increases, a Staff 
Sergeant’s impact on the performance of his or her unit increases. A sensitivity analysis 
of standard deviations reflects the impact of this assumption on unit productivity loss per 
2P Staff Sergeants, as shown in Figure 27. Average unit productivity loss varies from 
15.5 0.3 man-hours per week to 77 1 man-hours per week, based on the assumed 
standard deviation of the leadership effect. 
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Figure 27.  Histograms of Average Unit Productivity Loss Per 2P Staff Sergeant 
For Variable Leadership Effects. As the variance in leadership effects 
among Staff Sergeants increases, the productivity loss for units led by 
2P Staff Sergeants increases. 2P Staff Sergeant performance is 
assumed to be below average relative to the performance of the total 
Staff Sergeant inventory. Leadership effects for all Staff Sergeants are 
modeled for 10,000 replications. 
It is likely that 2P Staff Sergeant performance is frequently in the bottom third of 
Staff Sergeants. The worst-case scenario is that 2P Staff Sergeants are actually the lowest 
performers in the inventory. Using a 15-percent standard deviation for the leadership 
effect, a sensitivity analysis is conducted assuming below average, bottom third, and 
lowest performance for the relative performance of 2P Staff Sergeants, as shown in 
Figure 28. Average unit productivity loss varies from 46.5 0.8 man-hours per week to 
89.1 0.8 man-hours per week, based on assumed relative performance. 
5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 
Standard Deviation of Leadership Effects
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Figure 28.  Histograms of Average Unit Productivity Loss Per 2P Staff Sergeant 
For Variable Performance Relative To All Staff Sergeants. As the 
relative performance of a 2P Staff Sergeant decreases, the productivity 
loss for units led by 2P Staff Sergeants increases. Leadership effects 
for all Staff Sergeants are modeled as ~N(0,0.15) for 10,000 
replications. 
2. Potential Savings 
It is possible to calculate potential savings in terms of productivity loss using the 
reduction in steady-state inventory of 2P Staff Sergeants from the policy alternatives 
identified in Chapter VI. Using the base-case policy, over the course of a 52-week year, 
2P Staff Sergeants cost the Marine Corps 5.7 0.1 million man-hours, which is the same 
as 2,770 50 full-time equivalents (FTEs). Again, this is assuming 15-percent standard 
deviation in leadership effect and below-average performance for 2P Staff Sergeants. 
Using a 20-percent quality screen, productivity loss is reduced to 2,51040 FTEs. For  
a non-retention policy, productivity loss is reduced to 1,120 20 FTEs, as shown in 
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Figure 29.  Annual Productivity Loss Associated With 2P Staff Sergeants Across 
Policy Alternatives. A non-retention policy saves 1,650 FTEs of 
productivity over the base case, compared to 260 FTEs for a 20-
percent quality screen. Leadership effects for all Staff Sergeants are 
modeled as ~N(0,0.15) for 10,000 replications. 
B. TURNOVER HAZARD AND EXCESS ATTRITION 
Using the same assumptions regarding the number of Marines supervised by 2P 
Staff Sergeants, an average team size of 9.7 Marines is also used when discussing 
attrition. For this analysis, the attrition of 2P Staff Sergeants is not considered, only of 
their direct subordinates. Excess subordinate attrition resulting from 2P Staff Sergeant 
retention is simulated as a function of individual turnover hazard, which is a supervisor’s 
impact on subordinate retention. As introduced in Chapter II, one study identifies a 
turnover hazard with 12 percent standard deviation among supervisors (Lazear, Shaw, & 
Stanton, 2012). Although there is no attempt to determine the actual turnover hazard of 
Staff Sergeants within the Marine Corps, a standard deviation of 10 percent in turnover 
hazard is used with the average attrition rates to develop an order of magnitude 
assessment for 2P subordinate attrition. As determined in Chapter V, the average annual 
attrition probability for grades E1 through E5 is 0.20 0.01; this is used to model 
turnover hazard.  
Again, assuming Staff Sergeant performance is normally distributed, turnover 
hazards are simulated for the entire inventory of Staff Sergeants using a random normal 
distribution with a mean of 0.20 and a standard deviation of 0.10. The result is an 
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inventory where the average Staff Sergeant has a turnover hazard of 0.20, representing 
the average attrition rate of a subordinate, and a below-average Staff Sergeant has a 
higher than average turnover hazard. With a standard deviation of 10 percent, a Staff 
Sergeant in the bottom 5 percent of performers has a turnover hazard of 0.23, equivalent 
to a 23 percent probability of attrition per subordinate. This turnover hazard is 16 percent 
higher than the average Staff Sergeant; this distribution is generated for a single run of 
the simulation in Figure 30. A total of 10,000 replications are completed for each 
simulation. 
 
Figure 30.  Sample Turnover Hazard with 10-Percent Standard Deviation 
Simulated For 15,168 Staff Sergeants. Turnover hazard is simulated 
using a normal distribution with a mean of 0.20. Using a 10-percent 
standard deviation, the best and worst performers would have 
approximately a 35 percent increase or decrease in subordinate 
attrition, respectively. 
The leadership effect of 0.20 corresponds to expected attrition of 1.7 subordinates 
annually for a Staff Sergeant with an average team size of 9.7 Marines. Excess 
subordinate attrition for an individual Staff Sergeant, excessAttritioni, is calculated using 
Equation (24), where turnoverHazardi is the individual turnover hazard, 
turnoverHazardave is the average turnover hazard, and teamSize is the average team size 
for all Staff Sergeants. 
 excessAttritioni  turnoverHazardi  turnoverHazardave * teamSize  (24) 
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The initial assessment of excess attrition uses conservative assumptions of  
10-percent standard deviation in turnover hazard and below-average performance from 
2P Staff Sergeant relative to the full inventory. To simulate below-average performance, 
attrition hazards for each 2P Staff Sergeant are randomly selected from the lower half of 
the previously simulated attrition hazards for the inventory. Excess subordinate attrition 
is calculated for all simulated 2P Staff Sergeants. The result is an increase in expected 
subordinate attrition of 0.142 0.003 Marines per 2P Staff Sergeant. Using the base-case 
policy, total excess subordinate attrition for all 2P Staff Sergeants averages 339 Marines 
annually with a standard deviation of six Marines, as shown in Figure 31.  
 
Figure 31.  Average Excess Subordinate Attrition from 2P Staff Sergeants 
Annually in the Base Case. Assuming below-average performance 
from 2P Staff Sergeants and 10-percent standard deviation in the 
turnover hazard, 2P Staff Sergeants cause excess attrition of 339 6 
subordinates annually compared to average expected attrition. 
1. Sensitivity Analysis 
There is no available data on the actual impact that a Staff Sergeant has on unit 
attrition, so any measure of subordinate attrition is subject to variation based on the 
assumed deviation in turnover hazard. A small standard deviation suggests similar 
subordinate retention among Staff Sergeants. Conversely, a large standard deviation 
suggests that Staff Sergeants have a direct and significant impact on subordinate 
retention. A sensitivity analysis of standard deviations reflects the impact of this 
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assumption on excess subordinate attrition, as shown in Figure 32. Using the base-case 
policy, excess subordinate attrition varies from 170 3 Marines to 508 9 Marines 
annually, based on the assumed standard deviation of the turnover hazard. 
  
Figure 32.  Histograms of Excess Subordinate Attrition Attributable to 2P Staff 
Sergeants in the Base Case for Variable Turnover Hazards. As the 
variance in turnover hazard among Staff Sergeants increases, attrition 
for 2P subordinates increases. 2P Staff Sergeant performance is 
assumed to be below average relative to the total Staff Sergeant 
inventory.  
As with the evaluation of productivity loss, assuming that 2P Staff Sergeants have 
below-average performance is a conservative assumption. Using a 10-percent standard 
deviation in turnover hazard, a sensitivity analysis is conducted assuming below average, 
bottom third, and lowest performance for the relative performance of 2P Staff Sergeants, 
as shown in Figure 33. In the base case, excess subordinate attrition varies from 339 6 
Marines annually to 650 6 Marines annually, based on assumed relative performance. 
This accounts for roughly 1 to 2 percent of annual Marine Corps attrition. 
5% 10% 15% 
Standard Deviation of Turnover Hazard
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Figure 33.  Histograms of Increased Attrition Attributable to 2P Staff Sergeants in 
the Base Case for Variable Performance Relative to All Staff 
Sergeants. As the relative performance of a 2P Staff Sergeant 
decreases, attrition for 2P subordinates increases. Turnover hazard for 
all Staff Sergeants are modeled as ~N(0,0.10) for 10,000 replications. 
2. Potential Savings 
It is possible to calculate potential savings in terms of excess subordinate attrition 
using the reduction in steady-state inventory of 2P Staff Sergeants from policy 
alternatives identified in Chapter VI. Assuming a 10-percent standard deviation in 
turnover hazard and below-average performance for 2P Staff Sergeants, excess 
subordinate attrition due to 2P Staff Sergeants is 339 6 Marines, roughly 1 percent of 
the required number of recruits each year. Using a 20-percent quality screen, excess 
subordinate attrition is reduced to 307 5 Marines. For a non-retention policy, excess 
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Figure 34.  Annual Attrition Loss Associated With 2P Staff Sergeants Across 
Policy Alternatives. A non-retention policy reduces attrition by 203 
Marines over the base case, compared to a reduction of 32 Marines for 
a 20-percent quality screen. 2P Staff Sergeants are assumed to be 
below-average performers and the turnover hazard has a 10-percent 
standard deviation. 
C. RETIREMENT OBLIGATIONS 
The present value of retirement obligations are modeled by treating a military 
pension as a fixed-income annuity using Equation (25), where PV is the present value of 
the pension, PMTannual is the annual pension payment, r is the discount rate, and longevity 
is the expected number of years of payment.  
 PV  PMTAnnual
1 (1 r) longevity 
r
  (25) 
This is a conservative first-order approximation, as it does not include the cost of living 
adjustment for retirees. This analysis also excludes the cost of other retiree benefits, such 
as healthcare or commissary benefits.  
Longevity is modeled as a normal distribution with a mean of 44 years and 
standard deviation of 5 years, assuming the average 2P Staff Sergeant retires at age 38 
and lives to age 82. The average present value of a retirement is calculated at various 
discount rates for a retiring 2P cohort using a randomly generated longevity for each 
retiring Marine, 358 Staff Sergeants for the base case. A standard deviation is determined 
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using 10,000 iterations. The retirement benefit for a Staff Sergeant retiring after 20 years 
of service is 50 percent of his or her base pay, amounting to $1,862.10 per month for 
2015 (Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel & Readiness, 2015, n.d.). At a 6-percent 
discount rate, the average present value of a 2P Staff Sergeant retirement is $341,900 
with a standard deviation of $500. The estimated present value of retirement obligations 
incurred each year for retiring 2P Staff Sergeants under the base-case, quality screen, and 
non-retention policies is shown in Figure 35.  
 
Figure 35.  Mean Present Value Of 2P Staff Sergeant Retirement Obligations 
Incurred Annually. At a 6-percent discount rate, 2P Staff Sergeant 
retirement obligations have a present value of more than $122 million 
for the base case and $110 million for a 20-percent quality screen. A 
non-retention policy does not result in any retirement obligations for 
2P Staff Sergeants. 
D. SUMMARY 
Given the institutional costs of productivity loss, excess subordinate attrition, and 
retirement obligations, it is clear that considerations for 2P Staff Sergeant retention 
should consider more than the individual Marine. The most significant limitation is the 
lack of research surrounding the leadership effects and turnover hazards within the 
Marine Corps; however, existing research from external industries provides a basis for 
analysis. In the base case, a 2P Staff Sergeant inventory of 2,384 results in estimated 
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productivity losses of 2,770 50 FTEs, excess subordinate attrition of 3396 Marines, 
and retirement obligations with a present value of $122.3 $0.2 million on an annual 
basis. A 20-percent quality screen results in an estimated increase in productivity of 260 
FTEs, reduction in attrition of 32 Marines, and a reduction in retirement obligations of 
$11.6 million on an annual basis. Comparatively, a non-retention policy results in an 
estimated increase in productivity of 1,650 FTEs, reduction in attrition of 203 Marines on 
an annual basis, and zero retirement obligations. These results provide an order of 
magnitude estimate of the institutional costs associated with the retention of 2P Staff 
Sergeants. Although these estimates are simulated using a number of assumptions, they 
represent potentially significant recurring costs that can be reduced through the use of 
identified retention policies.  
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis shows that retention policy can effectively increase promotion rates 
and reduce the institutional cost associated with the retention of 2P Staff Sergeants. 
Reenlistment provides an opportunity to evaluate the quality of the force; however, if the 
objective is a reduction in 2P Staff Sergeants, there is a high error rate associated with a 
quality screen. Markov models provide valuable insight into the impact of retention 
policies on the enlisted personnel system. Finally, the institutional costs associated with 
the retention of low performers can be substantial. These considerations must be weighed 
against the “fairness” of denying a Marine further service following more than a decade 
of service. 
What we’ve always known is that the way we recruit, develop, retain, and 
promote Sailors and Marines is critical to our success. To fight and win in 
this century we need a force that draws from the broadest talent pools, 
values health and fitness, attracts and retains innovative thinkers, provides 
flexible career paths, and prioritizes merit over tenure. Whether we are 
talking about systems and tactics in the digital age or personnel 
management, we must evolve to meet the needs of the future battle space 
and the needs of our people; or we can—we will—lose. (Mabus, 2015) 
A. PREDICTORS OF 2P LIKELIHOOD 
The use of logistic regression to determine predictors of 2P likelihood provides 
insight into the Marine Corps evaluation and promotion process. The misclassification 
rate of the logistic regression is high, at 33 percent, but there are still strong indicators of 
quality that exist, which should influence retention decisions. Enhancements to this 
model may be possible with the availability of fitness report data; however, it is unclear 
whether this would improve the classification rate. Reenlistment cohorts are established 
based on TIS, which creates large variances in TIG and the amount of observable data at 
the rank of Staff Sergeant. The differences in observation time as a Staff Sergeant make 
direct comparisons between Marines difficult. For these reasons, evaluating 2P likelihood 
at the time of Zone C reenlistment is likely to continue to exhibit a high rate of 
misclassification. However, quality should still be a primary consideration in retention 
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decisions, and this model provides indicators of quality to assist in evaluating individual 
Marines. 
The positive indicators of 2P likelihood are low PFT score, commander’s 
recommendation, MCMAP belt, and AFQT score. PFT score is the most important 
variable in terms of response variability, suggesting that the difference between a high 
and low PFT score is significant even at higher enlisted ranks. A commander’s 
recommendation of “Not-Recommended” or “Recommended with Reservation” should 
carry more weight than a positive recommendation in determine retention decisions and 
serve as a significant red flag. MCMAP belt is also a significant indicator of performance 
and can be viewed as a proxy for intangible traits. It is not possible from this data to 
determine whether advancing through the MCMAP program makes a better Marine or 
better Marines advance farther through the MCMAP program. AFQT score is also 
significant, though less so than the other identified variables. 
Several binary characteristics also indicate higher 2P likelihood: adverse material, 
black racial identification, and being outside of height and weight regulations. Adverse 
material in grade, with an 11.4 odds-ratio, is significantly more important than adverse 
material prior to reaching the rank of Staff Sergeant, and should be heavily weighted in 
any retention decision. There does appear to be a racial bias in evaluating 2P likelihood; 
Marines with a black racial identifier have 1.5 times the odds of 2P outcomes compared 
to all other racial identifiers. This is particularly concerning and should be investigated 
further to determine whether changes are necessary to Marine Corps evaluation and 
promotion systems. Finally, being above the maximum weight for their height increases a 
Marine’s 2P likelihood. 
B. RETENTION POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
Implementation of the base-case, quality screen, and non-retention policies in the 
Markov model provides a comparison of annual promotion rates as a percent of the total 
inventory for that grade, and average TIG for each rank. There is a slight increase in the 
promotion rate for E1 through E5 as the number of 2P E6 in the system is reduced. The 
largest decrease in average TIG is for Staff Sergeants, which is reduced from 4.4 years in 
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the base case to 4.0 years for the quality screen and 3.8 years for the non-retention policy. 
A comparison of steady-state inventories from the three policy alternatives reveals a 
reduction in 2P E6 inventory, while maintaining the target inventory of total Staff 
Sergeants. A 20-percent quality screen reduces 2P Staff Sergeant inventory by 9.4 
percent and a non-retention policy reduces 2P Staff Sergeant inventory by 59.7 percent.  
If the objective is to reduce the inventory of 2P Staff Sergeants, a non-retention 
policy is significantly more effective than a quality screen at reenlistment, due to the 
difficulty in determining 2P likelihood. However, in the case of slow-promoting MOS, a 
limit on the number of approved reenlistments, known as boat spaces, can reduce the 
proportion of Staff Sergeants who are eventually twice-passed for promotion by using a 
quality screen. Although the developed quality screen has a high misclassification rate, it 
can inform the human decision makers. Both policies were shown to increase annual 
promotion rates, though the non-retention policy has a larger impact. The value of using 
Markov models is that the system can model varying amounts of detail and produce 
steady-state results to compare policy alternatives. 
C. INSTITUTIONAL COSTS 
Institutional costs of productivity loss, excess subordinate attrition, and retirement 
obligations make it clear that considerations for 2P Staff Sergeant retention should 
address more than the impact on the individual Marine. Unit productivity loss due to 2P 
Staff Sergeants and leadership effects may range from less than 20 man-hours to greater 
than 85 man-hours per week, based on sensitivity to relative performance and standard 
deviation in leadership effect. Assuming a 15-percent standard deviation and below-
average performance of 2P Staff Sergeants, 2,770 50 FTEs are lost each year due to 2P 
retention. Productivity loss is reduced to approximately 2,510 or 1,120 FTEs for a quality 
screen or non-retention policy, respectively. Productivity loss is frequently overlooked as 
an institutional cost of retaining low performers. A better understanding of leadership 
effects and their impacts is necessary.  
In addition to productivity loss, excess subordinate attrition may range from less 
than 200 to greater than 600 Marines annually, based on sensitivity to relative 
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performance and standard deviation in turnover hazard. Assuming a 10-percent standard 
deviation and below-average performance of 2P Staff Sergeants, there is excess attrition 
of 339 6 Marine subordinates each year due to 2P Staff Sergeant retention. Excess 
attrition is reduced to approximately 310 Marines or 140 Marines for the quality screen 
and non-retention policy, respectively. Finally, the present value of retirement obligations 
due to 2P Staff Sergeant retention are conservatively modeled as fixed income annuities, 
where a quality screen has a proportional reduction in retirement obligations to the 
reduction in 2P Staff Sergeants, from $122.3 0.2 million to approximately $110 million. 
A non-retention policy incurs no retirement obligations. The estimated institutional costs 
associated with each policy alternative are shown in Table 17.   
Table 17.   Estimated Institutional Costs Incurred Annually Due to 2P Staff 
Sergeant Retention. 








Base Case 2,380 $120 M 2,770 FTEs 340 Marines 
20% Quality Screen 2,160 $110 M 2,510 FTEs 310 Marines 
Non-Retention    960 $    0 M 1,120 FTEs 140 Marines 
 
Although these estimates are simulated using a number of assumptions, they 
represent potentially significant recurring costs that can be reduced through the use of 
identified retention policies. The results of this study also show that targeted retention 
policies can have a direct impact on improving promotion tempo and should supplement 
current promotion policies as a means of ensuring quality in the enlisted force.  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis evaluates enlisted retention in aggregate; however, it is recommended 
that the impact of retention policies be evaluated for each MOS, as the desired results for 
fast-promoting and slow-promoting MOS is different. For slow-promoting MOS, 
reducing retention of 2P Staff Sergeants and limiting the number of approved 
reenlistments could result in the desired increase in the rate of promotions. Likewise, an 
increase in retention of Marines in fast-promoting MOS will result in the desired decrease 
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in the rate of promotions. The existing policy of variable selection opportunity for fast-
promoting and slow-promoting MOS artificially inflates or deflates the average TIS for 
promotion by expanding or contracting promotion zones. By definition, variable selection 
opportunity does not provide for equal promotion opportunity across all MOS. Instead, 
Marines in slow-promoting MOS face more competition on each board.  
The results of this thesis suggest that an alternative way to meet target TIS to 
promotion is through retention policy. Slow-promoting MOS will be disproportionally 
impacted during the implementation phase of a 2P Staff Sergeant Retention Policy 
because a larger proportion of eligible Marines in these MOS are passed each year, but 
these same MOS have the most to gain from this type of policy implementation. A 
reduction in 2P Staff Sergeants will effectively increase promotion rates and upward 
mobility. In addition, the use of boat spaces, which already limit the number of approved 
reenlistments for FTAP Marines, could help stabilize retention rates between years and 
MOS. This will have a positive impact on reducing the number of slow-promoting MPP 
and will reduce the number of Marines passed for promotion by increasing selection 
opportunity for the Marines on any given board.  
Though not considered in this analysis, additional policies targeting Marines in 
fast-promoting MOS for increased retention of the best and most highly qualified would 
allow for the appropriate level of competition on each promotion board, without retaining 
and promoting low-quality Marines for the sake of meeting target requirements. 
Retention policy, not promotion opportunity, is the appropriate avenue to address 
concerns regarding target promotion tempo. The current Staff Sergeant Retention Boards 
offer a limited version of the non-retention policy and should be evaluated as a long-term 
solution for 2P Staff Sergeant retention.  
E. FUTURE WORK 
There is tremendous potential for additional work surrounding Marine quality and 
the impact of quality on unit performance and subordinates; however, data management 
within the Marine Corps makes that a challenge. Fitness report data is maintained 
separately from other personnel records and reenlistment data is maintained in an isolated 
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system. Currently, there is limited record of a Marine’s enlisted chain of command 
throughout his or her career, making a study of leadership effects difficult. Despite data 
management challenges, the value of understanding leadership impacts within the Marine 
Corps could have significant institutional benefits. One of the major limitations in this 
analysis is the lack of data on the actual leadership impact and turnover hazard associated 
with Staff Sergeants in the Marine Corps. Although the impact of turnover hazard was 
relatively small across the range of standard deviations, the impact of leadership effect is 
likely to be quite significant, perhaps more so than indicated by studies from other 
industries. The actual institutional cost of retaining poor performers at any rank is 
unknown and represents a blind spot in the current manpower decision-making process. 
 
 87
APPENDIX A. 1994 DECISION BRIEF: PHASE II OF MARINE 
CORPS TRANSITION TO ENLISTED “UP OR OUT” RETENTION / 
PROMOTION POLICY 
 
Figure 36.  1994 Up-Or-Out Decision Brief (Page 1 of 4). Implements an “Up Or 
Out” policy for 2P Staff Sergeants, signed by General Carl E. Mundy 
Jr., CMC (from MPP-20, p. 1). 
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Figure 37.  1994 Up-Or-Out Decision Brief (Page 2 of 4). Implements an “Up Or 
Out” policy for 2P Staff Sergeants, signed by General Carl E. Mundy 
Jr., CMC (from MPP-20, p. 2). 
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Figure 38.  1994 Up-Or-Out Decision Brief (Page 3 of 4). Implements an “Up Or 
Out” policy for 2P Staff Sergeants, signed by General Carl E. Mundy 
Jr., CMC (from MPP-20, p. 3). 
 90
 
Figure 39.  1994 Up-Or-Out Decision Brief (Page 4 of 4). Implements an “Up Or 
Out” policy for 2P Staff Sergeants, signed by General Carl E. Mundy 
Jr., CMC (from MPP-20, p. 4). 
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APPENDIX B. ARCHIVED CORRESPONDENCE REGARDING 2P 
STAFF SERGEANT RETENTION POLICY (1994–1999) 
 
Figure 40.  1994 LtGen Christmas Memorandum to Mr. Pang (Page 1 of 2). 
LtGen George R. Christmas, Deputy Chief of Staff for M&RA, 
memorandum for Frederick F. Y. Pang, Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy (M&RA), outlining the approved Marine Corps “Up-Or-Out” 
policy (from Christmas, 1994, p. 1). 
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Figure 41.  1994 LtGen Christmas Memorandum to Mr. Pang (Page 2 of 2). 
LtGen George R. Christmas, Deputy Chief of Staff for M&RA, 
memorandum for Frederick F. Y. Pang, Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy (M&RA), outlining the approved Marine Corps “Up-Or-Out” 
policy (from Christmas, 1994, p. 2). 
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Figure 42.  1995 LtGen Christmas Memorandum to Dr. Rostker (Page 1 of 4). 
LtGen George R. Christmas, Deputy Chief of Staff for M&RA, 
memorandum for Bernard D. Rostker, Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(M&RA), addressing expressed concerns about compensation for 
separated 2P Staff Sergeants (from Christmas, 1995, p. 1). 
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Figure 43.  1995 LtGen Christmas Memorandum to Dr. Rostker (Page 2 of 4). 
LtGen George R. Christmas, Deputy Chief of Staff for M&RA, 
memorandum for Bernard D. Rostker, Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(M&RA), addressing expressed concerns about compensation for 
separated 2P Staff Sergeants (from Christmas, 1995, p. 2). 
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Figure 44.  1995 LtGen Christmas Memorandum to Dr. Rostker (Page 3 of 4). 
LtGen George R. Christmas, Deputy Chief of Staff for M&RA, 
memorandum for Bernard D. Rostker, Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(M&RA), addressing expressed concerns about compensation for 
separated 2P Staff Sergeants (from Christmas, 1995, p. 3). 
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Figure 45.  1995 LtGen Christmas Memorandum to Dr. Rostker (Page 4 of 4). 
LtGen George R. Christmas, Deputy Chief of Staff for M&RA, 
memorandum for Bernard D. Rostker, Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(M&RA), addressing expressed concerns about compensation for 
separated 2P Staff Sergeants (from Christmas, 1995, p. 4). 
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Figure 46.  1996 Dr. Rostker Memorandum to LtGen Christmas (Page 1 of 5). 
Bernard D. Rostker, Asst. Secretary of the Navy (M&RA), 
memorandum to LtGen George R. Christmas, Deputy Chief of Staff, 
M&RA, concerning equity of the 2P Staff Sergeant retention policy 
and potential for a 14-year continuation board. Author of handwritten 
notes unknown (from Lange, 1996, Encl 1, p. 1). 
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Figure 47.  1996 Dr. Rostker Memorandum to LtGen Christmas (Page 2 of 5). 
Bernard D. Rostker, Asst Secretary of the Navy (M&RA), 
memorandum to LtGen George R. Christmas, Deputy Chief of Staff, 
M&RA, concerning equity of the 2P Staff Sergeant retention policy 
and potential for a 14-year continuation board. Author of handwritten 
notes unknown (from Lange, 1996, Encl. 1, p. 2). 
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Figure 48.  1996 Dr. Rostker Memorandum to LtGen Christmas (Page 3 of 5). 
Bernard D. Rostker, Asst. Secretary of the Navy (M&RA), 
memorandum to LtGen George R. Christmas, Deputy Chief of Staff, 
M&RA, concerning equity of the 2P Staff Sergeant retention policy 
and potential for a 14-year continuation board. Author of handwritten 
notes unknown (from Lange, 1996, Encl. 1, p. 3). 
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Figure 49.  1996 Dr. Rostker Memorandum to LtGen Christmas (Page 4 of 5). 
Bernard D. Rostker, Asst. Secretary of the Navy (M&RA), 
memorandum to LtGen George R. Christmas, Deputy Chief of Staff, 
M&RA, concerning equity of the 2P Staff Sergeant retention policy 
and potential for a 14-year continuation board. Author of handwritten 
notes unknown (from Lange, 1996, Encl. 1, p. 4). 
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Figure 50.  1996 Dr. Rostker Memorandum to LtGen Christmas (Page 5 of 5). 
Bernard D. Rostker, Asst. Secretary of the Navy (M&RA), 
memorandum to LtGen George R. Christmas, Deputy Chief of Staff, 
M&RA, concerning equity of the 2P Staff Sergeant retention policy 
and potential for a 14-year continuation board. Author of handwritten 
notes unknown (from Lange, 1996, Encl. 1, p. 5). 
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Figure 51.  SSgt Geheb Letter to Congress (Page 1 of 2). SSgt Kenneth W. Geheb 
letter to the House Committee on National Security, expressing 
concern regarding the 2P Staff Sergeant retention policy (from 
Dornan, 1996, Encl 1, p. 1). 
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Figure 52.  SSgt Geheb Letter to Congress (Page 2 of 2). SSgt Kenneth W. Geheb 
letter to the House Committee on National Security, expressing 
concern regarding the 2P Staff Sergeant retention policy (from 
Dornan, 1996, Encl 1, p. 2). 
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Figure 53.  Representative Dornan Letter to CMC. Representative Robert K. 
Dornan, Chairman, Military Personnel Subcommittee, letter to General 
Charles C. Krulak, CMC, expressing concern regarding the 2P Staff 
Sergeant policy (from Dornan, 1996, p. 1). 
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Figure 54.  Memorandum Advocating for the Separation of 2P Staff Sergeants 
with Fewer than 18 Years TIS (Page 1 of 2). SgtMaj Mark Ouellette, 
Sergeant Major, M&RA, memorandum to LtGen Jack W. Klimp, 
Deputy Chief of Staff, M&RA (from Ouellette, 1999, p. 1).  
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Figure 55.  Memorandum Advocating for the Separation of 2P Staff Sergeants 
with Fewer than 18 Years TIS (Page 2 of 2). SgtMaj Mark Ouellette, 
Sergeant Major, M&RA, memorandum to LtGen Jack W. Klimp, 




APPENDIX C. MOS CATEGORIES 
Table 18.   MOS Category by Occupational Field. Observations sorted by 
occupational field and MOS. 
MOS Category Occupational Field Code Occupational Field Count 
Percent 
of Total 
Administration 01 Personnel & Administration 537 6.6% 
Aviation 
Maintenance 
59 Electronics Maintenance 78 1.0% 
60 Aircraft Maintenance 335 4.1% 
61 Helicopter Mechanic 417 5.1% 
62 Fixed-Wing Mechanic 257 3.2% 
Aviation Support 
63 Organizational Avionics 232 2.8% 
64 Intermediate Avionics 169 2.1% 
65 Aviation Ordnance 141 1.7% 
66 Aviation Logistics 137 1.7% 
68 Meteorological & Oceanographic 23 0.3% 
70 Airfield Services 141 1.7% 
72 Air Support 112 1.4% 




08 Artillery 212 2.6% 
13 Engineer 365 4.5% 
18 Tanks & Amphibious Assault Vehicles 137 1.7% 
Communications 
06 Communications 709 8.7% 
28 Data / Communications Maintenance 293 3.6% 
Infantry 03 Infantry 919 11.3% 
Intelligence 02 Intelligence 247 3.0% 26 Signals Intelligence 103 1.3% 
Logistics 
04 Logistics 240 2.9% 
11 Utilities 118 1.4% 
21 Ground Ordnance Maintenance 203 2.5% 
33 Food Service 154 1.9% 
35 Motor Transport 607 7.4% 
Supply / 
Ammunition 
23 Ammunition 177 2.2% 
30 Supply Administration 423 5.2% 
31 Distribution Management 32 0.4% 
34 Financial Management 71 0.9% 
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05 Plans 20 0.2% 
41 Morale, Welfare, and Recreation 16 0.1% 
43 Public Affairs 19 0.2% 
44 Legal Services 38 0.5% 
46 Combat Camera 31 0.4% 
48 Retention 30 0.4% 
55 Music 67 0.8% 
57 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, & Nuclear 47 0.6% 
58 Military Police 237 2.9% 
84 Recruiting 31 0.4% 
Grand Total 8,151 100% 
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APPENDIX D. UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS FOR NON-SELECTED 
VARIABLES 
A. FISCAL YEAR 
Table 19.   Observations by Fiscal Year. There are fewer observations in the 
final sample from FY10 and FY11 due to a higher number of 
indeterminate observations in these fiscal years. 
 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 
Observations 1,708 2,059 1,802 1,417 1,165 
 
 
Figure 56.  Mosaic Plot of Staff Sergeants Twice-Passed (2P) by RELM Fiscal 
Year. FY10 has the highest proportion of Staff Sergeants twice-passed 
and FY11 has the lowest proportion (Likelihood Ratio Chi-Squared = 
2; p-value = 0.75). 
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B. MOS CATEGORY 
 
Figure 57.  Mosaic Plot of Staff Sergeants Twice-Passed (2P) by MOS Category. 
Infantry has the highest proportion of Staff Sergeants twice-passed and 
Communications has the lowest proportion (Likelihood Ratio Chi-
Squared = 16; p-value = 0.07) 
C. RIFLE AND PISTOL QUALIFICATION 
Rifle and pistol qualifications are not retained within TFRS, so these data fields 
are pulled from TFDW using the last score before a Marine’s pre-reenlistment EAS. Rifle 
and pistol qualification scoring changed between FY07 and FY11, so qualification was 
treated as an ordinal value from 0 to 3, Unqualified to Expert. Those Marines listed as 
“Not Required” for rifle (seven observations) or pistol (eight observations) are given a 




Figure 58.  Log-Odds and Logistic Fit of Staff Sergeants Twice-Passed (2P) by 
Rifle Qualification. Log-Odds shows a reciprocal relationship with 
Rifle Qualification. The univariate logistic regression shows a lower 
rifle qualification is correlated to a higher likelihood of Staff Sergeants 
twice-passed (Chi-Squared = 28; p-value < 0.01). 
  
Figure 59.  Log-Odds and Logistic Fit of Staff Sergeants Twice-Passed (2P) by 
Pistol Qualification. Log-Odds shows a split relationship between 
unqualified and qualified Marines, so a dichotomous interaction is 
created. The univariate logistic regression shows that, among qualified 
Marines, lower pistol qualification is correlated to a higher likelihood 
of Staff Sergeants twice-passed (Chi-Squared = 41; p-value < 0.01). 
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D. DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLES 
Table 20.   Proportion of Staff Sergeants Twice Passed (2P) by Additional 
Relevant Variables. A Commanding General Certification for 
reenlistment correlates to a higher proportion of Staff Sergeants 
twice-passed. Being Female, having more than a high school 
education, or being a Purple Heart recipient correlates to a lower 
proportion of Staff Sergeants twice-passed. 








Bronze Star or 
Greater 280 39.6 % 7,871 40.7 %    0.72 
Commanding 
General Certification 109 74.3 % 8,042 40.2 % < 0.01 
Gender (Female) 456 36.4 % 7,695 40.9 %    0.06 
Greater Than High 
School Education 548 33.9 % 7,603 41.1 % < 0.01 
Hispanic 1,417 40.4 % 6,734 40.7 %    0.81 
Purple Heart 
Recipient 172 27.3 % 7,979 40.9 % < 0.01 
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APPENDIX E. JMP REGRESSION RESULTS 
A. MIN-BIC NOMINAL LOGISTIC MODEL 
 
Figure 60.  Min-BIC Nominal Logistic Regression Model. JMP output for the 







Figure 61.  Min-BIC Odds Ratios. JMP output of the odds-ratios for the Min-BIC 
logistic regression model. 
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B. P-VALUE < 0.05 NOMINAL LOGISTIC MODEL 
 
Figure 62.  P-value Nominal Logistic Regression Model. JMP output for the p-
value logistic regression model. 
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C. MIN-AIC NOMINAL MODEL 
  
Figure 63.  Min-AIC Nominal Logistic Regression Model. JMP output for the 
selected Min-AIC logistic regression model. 
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